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This thesis explores the impact of atrocities that 
Japan committed against its neighbors during and prior to 
World War II on Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, 
China and the Republic of Korea.  The issues of Japan’s 
wartime treatment of Comfort Women, the atrocities of the 
Rape of Nanking and Japanese chemical and biological 
testing on humans, remain contentious with the governments 
and the people of China and the Republic of Korea, who feel 
that Japan has never fully apologized for its actions 
during World War II.  They assert that Japan feels no 
remorse, as evidenced by treatment of World War II in 
Japanese school textbooks and by government officials 
visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead are 
commemorated.  The Japanese counter that they have offered 
sincere apologies.  Consequently, this lingering animosity 
still affects Tokyo’s efforts to achieve its foreign policy 
goals and expand its international influence, among other 
things, through seeking a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council and by possibly amending Article 9 
of its Constitution.  Additionally, this discord affects 
Japan’s regional relations.  Japan, China and the Republic 
of Korea all share an interest in regional stability and 
their economies are inextricably linked. Nevertheless, 
discord over these historical questions complicates 
relations that are already strained by competition for 
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The 1930s and 40s are defined by the expansion of two 
countries across the borders of their neighbors in the 
pursuit of furthering their own nationalistic desires and 
the devastating wars the rest of the world fought to stop 
their aggression.  Both Germany and Japan inflicted massive 
damage on both the civilian populations and military forces 
of their neighbors, yet both countries have experienced 
vastly different relationships in the post war era.  While 
Germany has assimilated relatively easily back into the 
European realm, Japan has not enjoyed the same return to 
harmonious relations with its neighbors.  Unlike Germany, 
Japan, in the eyes of its neighbors, has never fully 
apologized to its neighbors for its actions or admitted 
full culpability for the atrocities it committed within the 
region.  As a result, Japan’s relationships with its 
neighbors, specifically China and Korea, are marred by the 
inherent distrust that the governments and the citizens of 
these two countries harbor toward Japan.   
This thesis examines the relationship between Japan 
and its neighbors and, in particular, the role that Japan’s 
actions in World War II still exert in every interaction, 
both in government and in society, with China and the 
Republic of Korea.  The exploration of these atrocities, 
Japan’s treatment at the Tokyo Tribunal, and its 
revitalization shortly thereafter provides an understanding 
of the lingering resentment of the Japanese and its 
influence on Japan’s foreign policy goals.  Also, Tokyo’s 
reaction to its history plays a vital role in the 
intricacies of this dynamic.  The consistent apologies 
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issued by numerous Japanese prime ministers and other 
government officials, coupled with the seemingly insincere 
nature of these apologies, shade every interaction between 
the governments and affects foreign policy plans.  This 
first chapter presents a basic overview of these issues. 
The following chapters provide an in-depth discussion of 
the nuances of Japan’s history, their effect on current 
relations with China and the Republic of Korea, and the 
role of the apology in current and future interactions.  
Many Japanese prime ministers, such as former Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have offered statements of 
regret and remorse over the “tremendous damage and 
suffering for the people of many countries, particularly 
those of Asian nations”1 caused by Japan’s past aggression.  
However, these statements are generally not accepted by 
these Asian nations, principally China and the Republic of 
Korea, as being sincere, because they perceive that the 
actions of the Japanese government in atoning for past 
atrocities do not align with its rhetoric.  This dichotomy 
is particularly evident in Japan’s handling of several key 
issues stemming from World War II: the military’s 
recruitment and subsequent use of women coerced into 
service for soldiers, known as Comfort Women, the Rape of 
Nanking as the Japanese Imperial Army overtook the city, 
and the chemical and biological testing and experimentation 
conducted on humans and cities in China.  These actions 
committed by the Japanese are taken as representative of 
the barbarous treatment of the people of the nations that 
 
                     1 “Japanese PM apologizes over war,” BBC News, 22 April 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4471495.stm, 
accessed 10 May 2008. 
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they conquered, and they play a fundamental role in 
straining relations between Japan and its two closest 
neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea.  
Additionally, from the perspective of some of Japan’s 
neighbors, post-World War II efforts did not satisfactorily 
hold Japan accountable for the atrocities it committed 
during this period of aggression.  Although the Tokyo 
Tribunal prosecuted high ranking Japanese leaders and other 
government officials for general actions of crimes against 
humanity, the trials failed to hold these leaders 
responsible for many of the specific wrongs committed or 
define a punishment system limiting those individuals 
convicted from holding public office.  Specifically, the 
Tribunal did not address the issues of Comfort Women and 
the biological and chemical experimentation.  The trials 
also failed to achieve acceptance either within Japan or 
among the victim countries, due to a common belief that the 
trials were merely a tool for “victor’s justice.”2  This 
notion stems from the Western composition of the court, the 
seeming hypocrisy of representatives from nations involved 
in colonization on the court, and the allowance of 
convicted “Class A” war criminal to hold government office 
after the signing of peace treaties 12 years later.  The 
proceedings also did not hold the Emperor, Hirohito, 
accountable for any of Japan’s actions.  While he did 
renounce his divinity, he was not prosecuted, resulting in 
a Japanese society that was able to place blame solely on 
its military leaders.3   Furthermore, the United States 
                     
2 John W. Dower, Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War 
II, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1999), 461, 465. 
3 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, (New 
York, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 574-575. 
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played a very instrumental role in shaping and easing a 
post-war Japan through the recovery process.  Ensconced as 
the de facto leader of the Allied occupation, the United 
States established a government structure for post-war 
Japan that implemented facets of the bureaucratic system 
that are still in place in Japan today, penned a new 
Constitution that renounced the act of war as a foreign 
policy option,4 and aided the revitalization of the Japanese 
economy and state to provide a counter to the rising 
communist threat within the region in the late 1940s.5   As 
a result, Japan transitioned into a thriving economic 
powerhouse that nevertheless still suffers strained 
relations with its closest neighbors due to its wartime 
actions.   
Second, the aftermath of World War II resulted in the 
complete revision of the Meiji constitution.  With a “no 
war” provision in the postwar “peace” Constitution, Article 
9 stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war 
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes.”6  This 
article has served as the basis for Japan’s foreign policy 
strategy and has resulted in a Japan that has centered its 
diplomatic endeavors on its status as an economic 
powerhouse.  Japan’s adoption of the role of a “nation of 
peace” contains three specific pillars that have defined 
Japan’s international interaction since its revitalization: 
                     
4 Marius B. Jansen, The making of modern Japan, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 
669. 
5 Bix, 625, 635. 
6 The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Article 9, 03 November 




diplomatic support of the United Nations, collaboration 
between “Free World” nations, and focus on the Asian 
nations.7    
However, over the past several years, the ruling party 
in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, has been actively 
seeking to make Japan a larger player in global security 
affairs.  The addition of a fourth pillar, the “Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity,” expands Japan’s traditional 
foreign policy objectives to include an added focus on 
spreading the values of freedom, democracy and human rights 
from Northern Europe through the Middle East to Northeast 
Asia, while still maintaining its stance as a “nation of 
peace.”  Key steps to achieve this aim include amending 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, seeking a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council, actively 
participating in Gulf War II, and increasing monetary aid 
and peacekeeping endeavors to foreign countries through the 
United Nations and through the directed efforts of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA).  In support of this new 
measure, the Japanese government has increased its monetary 
aid to foreign countries, comprising 19.47 percent of total 
United Nations (UN) contributions in 2005,8 and has provided 
troops for service in Iraq and an oiler to support 
Coalition Forces in the Arabian Gulf during Gulf War II.   
Although several Japanese leaders have issued 
statements expressing remorse and regret for the events in 
the past, no statement has adequately expressed the degree 
                     7 Aso Taro, “Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” (Japan) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic blue book 2007 summary, March 
2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/message.pdf, 
accessed 31 May 2008. 
8 “UN Reform: Japan speaks up,” Japan Echo, Vol. 32, special issue, 
2005, www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2005/32sp05.html, accessed 10 May 2008. 
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of culpability necessary for the statements to be accepted 
as sincere by China and the Republic of Korea and not be 
seen as a means to an end.  Both countries find these 
statements insincere because of the actions of the Japanese 
government in redressing the past atrocities.9  The 
government continues to fail to recognize the legal claims 
of the Comfort Women, as exemplified by court rulings 
against awarding reparations to the victims.  This 
perceived failure to acknowledge past wrongdoings is also 
seen in the historical narratives that Japanese lawmakers 
sanction for publication in Japanese school textbooks, 
which do not accurately describe the role that Japan played 
in World War II.10  Additionally, Japanese government 
officials, including prime ministers, have paid visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial dedicated to Japanese war 
dead.  Since the Shrine also houses “Class A” War Criminals 
from World War II, the Chinese and Koreans consider that 
these official visits as intended to honor Japanese past 
aggression, an act in direct opposition to the rhetoric of 
remorse uttered by Japanese politicians.11  Therefore, these 
events, coupled with a rise in Japanese nationalism, often 
inflame and reignite the unresolved issues between Japan 
and its neighbors, negatively affecting Japan’s drive to 
expand its foreign policy objectives.  
                     9 Sheila Smith, “Ties that bind,” South China Morning Post, 21 May 
2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 27 May 2008. 
10 Anthony Faiola, “Japanese schoolbooks anger South Korea, China,” 
The Washington Post, 06 April 2005, ProQuest Document ID 817661671, 
accessed 10 April 2005. 
11 Anthony Faiola, “Koizumi stirs anger with war shrine visit,” The 
Washington Post, 15 August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401425.html?nav=rss_world, 
accessed 08 June 2008. 
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Third, Japan’s actions during World War II stimulate a 
sincere fear of a resurgent militarist Japan in the people 
of both China and the Republic of Korea.12  Although the 
governments of both countries must manipulate this concern 
of their countrymen, they also use the apology issue as a 
means of leverage with their interactions with Japan.  By 
rehashing previous wrongs, the governments act to shape the 
reactions of their people, while simultaneously limiting 
the responses of Tokyo.  This influence is generally 
accomplished through the publication of reactions to events 
in various media. 
However, Beijing and Seoul utilize this political tool 
in limited fashion, as the futures of their countries are 
inextricably linked with Japan.  All three governments 
share a concern for economic stability and regional 
security.  The economies of Japan, China and the Republic 
of Korea are dependent upon each other for their continued 
prosperity.  In 2006, China and Japan conducted $130 
billion in trade with each other,13 while Japan accounts for 
one sixth of Korea’s total imports and exports.14  The three 
countries also believe that North Korea poses the largest 
threat to regional security and that cooperation is the 
only method to neutralize Pyongyang.  Seeking to prevent 
North Korea’s nuclearization, Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul have 
entered into various cooperative structures, such as the 
Six Party Talks, to facilitate the process. 
                     
12 Ng Tze-wei, “Old rivals still wary of each other despite 
diplomatic dhaw,” 03 June 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 05 June 2008. 
13 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, accessed 11 June 2008. 
14 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Korea, South, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ks.html#Econ, accessed 11 June 2008. 
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Despite these links of strong trade relations and 
mutual desire to maintain regional stability, China and the 
Republic of Korea remain distrustful of Japan due to 
disagreements over current territorial claims and energy 
sources in the East China Sea and the Takeshima (Dokdo) 
Islands.  China and Japan dispute the territorial boundary 
of the East China Sea and its estimated seven trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas and approximately 100 billion 
barrels of oil.15  Both countries continue to claim 
ownership of the area and its resources.  Additionally, the 
Republic of Korea clashes with Japan over the proper naming 
and ownership of the body of water that separates the two 
countries and small islands in that sea.  The Sea of Japan 
(East Sea) is located between Korea’s eastern shore and 
Japan’s western coastline, and both countries claim that 
its name for the body of water possesses historical 
precedence.  Similarly, both countries lay historical claim 
to a small island chain in the sea, the Takeshima or Dokdo 
Islands. 
Thus, although China and the Republic of Korea possess 
sufficient motivation for solid relations with Japan in 
their shared need for economic prosperity and regional 
security, many factors hinder their cooperation.   Current 
debates over ownership rights of territories and natural 
resources, coupled with the lingering fears from World War 
II atrocities, result in a Japan that must balance these 
concerns with its own shifting foreign policy intentions.  
Therefore, as Japan continues to pursue its expanded role 
in the diplomatic arena, its government should engage both                      15 Anthony Faiola, “Japan-China oil dispute escalates,” The 
Washington Post, 22 October 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-




the people and the governments of China and the Republic of 
Korea.  Japan’s leaders should continue to express remorse, 
reassuring neighbors of its peaceful intent, address World 
War II issues while balancing support for own people, and 
continue to engage the governments and the people of China 
and the Republic of Korea diplomatically, economically and 
socially.  By accomplishing these items, Japan can act to 
resolve the tensions between its history and its neighbors 
and successfully move toward a future not encumbered by its 
past.   
This introduction has provided the background for the 
next sections, which focus on the history of Japan’s World 
War II actions and aftermath, Japan’s foreign policy goals 
and its growing role in foreign affairs, the various 
unresolved issues lingering from World War II, and the role 
of the apology in Japan’s interactions with China and the 
Republic of Korea.  Together, these stressors impede 
possible avenues for Japan to achieve balance with its 
neighbors and its foreign policy goals. 












































II. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF APOLOGY 
A. WORLD WAR II INFLUENCES 
In July 1853, United States Commodore Matthew Perry 
steamed into Edo Bay, instigating the process that would 
eventually open Japan up to its neighbors and the West.  In 
the early 1600s, the ruling shogunate adopted a policy of 
exclusion and since then, Japan’s rulers had maintained an 
isolated front in all foreign policy matters, from trade to 
diplomacy.  However, after Perry’s visit, the Japanese, 
possessing poor coastal defenses, felt pressured into 
accepting treaties with the United States, and subsequently 
the Dutch, Russians, French and British, in order to avoid 
the show of force and resulting devastating wars that had 
occurred in China.16  Although this process of opening up 
Japan was much less divisive then the Chinese experience, 
the treaties still subjected Japan to unfavorable trade 
relations with foreign governments.  Forced to take a 
subservient role and viewed by the Western nations as 
inherently unequal, by 1868 the new Meiji government had 
implemented efforts to transform Japan into a strong 
economic and industrialized nation that could compete 
militarily and achieve equality with the West.17  It is this 
emphasis on military might and national pride that 
eventually resulted in a strong Japanese nation, desirous 
of overcoming past slights and proving its equality to the 
world. 
                     16 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East 
Asia: Tradition and transformation, revised ed. Harvard University 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 487-488. 
17 Ibid., 504-507. 
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Thus, with the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, 
an increasingly nationalistic Japan tested its military 
might toward its neighbors.  The Russo-Japanese War, the 
first victory of an Asian nation over a Western power, in 
1904-1905, shortly followed Japan’s victory over China.  In 
1905, Japan adopted Korea as a protectorate, and five years 
later, it officially annexed the country, establishing a 
Japanese government under a Governor-General of Korea.18  
Japan’s expansion continued and in 1931, it invaded 
Manchuria, and by 1937, the Imperial Army had overtaken 
Shanghai, Nanking and Beijing in the second Sino-Japanese 
War.19  This march to conquer Southeast Asia continued until 
Japan’s defeat by the Allied Forces in 1945. 
While war is rife with death and destruction, 
international rules exist to keep the battle from being 
waged directly against civilian population.  However, 
during its aggressive rise in Asia, the Japanese government 
and military forces committed several acts that overstepped 
these bounds and resulted in the exploitation and death of 
thousands of individuals: specifically, the procurement of 
comfort women, the Rape of Nanking, and chemical/biological 
weapons testing and experimentation on individuals and 
cities in northeast China.  These issues remain contentious 
within Chinese and Korean societies and continue to plague 
the mending of ties between Japan and its nearest 
neighbors.   
 
                     18 Fairbank, Reischaeur, Craig, 553-557.  Provides more in depth 
overview of Imperial Japan’s demonstration of military force in the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
19 Ibid., 705-709, 713-715. 
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Moreover, the revitalization of Japan’s economy and 
government structure after its crushing defeat in World War 
II resulted from the process and outcome of the Tokyo 
Tribunal and the direct involvement of the United States in 
recovery efforts, as communism swept into northeast Asia.  
While the Tokyo Tribunal did hold key government officials 
and military leaders accountable for their general crimes 
against humanity and for their actions in the Rape of 
Nanking, it did not address all of the crimes committed, 
such as the chemical/biological testing and the Comfort 
Women.   
Additionally, the trials and the subsequent recovery 
efforts allowed for continuity of government structure and 
did not hold the Japanese Emperor responsible for any 
actions.  Furthermore, the United States, deeply involved 
in both processes, ultimately promoted Japan’s economic 
recovery in order to use the country as a base for 
struggles against the rise of communism in the region, a 
threat made more real in the late 1940s with the fall of 
China and Russia’s successful testing of an atom bomb.  As 
a result, the 1950s saw a Japan that had economically 
recovered from its devastating defeat.  Also during its 
revitalization, Japan adopted a constitution that embraced 
the notion that it would never use war as a means to 
achieve political gain or resolve international disputes 
and that it would never raise military forces for any other 
matter than self defense.20  As a result, these various 
 
 
                     20 The Constitution of Japan, 03 November 1946, 




influences in Japan’s post-war recovery have impacted the 
ability of Japan to normalize relationships with China and 
the Republic of Korea.   
B. UNRESOLVED FACTORS FROM WORLD WAR II 
In its march through the countries of Asia, the 
Japanese committed many acts of war against its neighbors.  
However, several of these incidents still engender great 
distrust toward the Japanese by the people and the 
governments of these countries, specifically China and the 
Republic of Korea.  The treatment of Comfort Women, the 
Rape of Nanking and the Chemical/Biological testing both in 
the postwar efforts and today do not leave the Chinese and 
Koreans satisfied that Japan has properly atoned for its 
actions and has resulted in continued tensions between the 
countries. 
1. Comfort Women 
The phrase “comfort women” is the accepted English 
translation of the Japanese word, “ianfu,” used to describe 
the thousands of women that the Japanese Imperial Ministry 
forcibly recruited or tricked in order to provide sexual 
services for the members of the Japanese Imperial Army 
prior to and during World War II.21  These women, often 
raped 20 to 30 times a day by the soldiers, have not 
received recognition or reparations from the Japanese 
government, and their struggle for acknowledgement of the 
wrongs committed against them remains a source of tension 
between Japan and its neighbors. 
                     21 David Andrew Schmidt, Ianfu-The Comfort Women of the Japanese 
Imperial Army of the pacific war: Broken silence, (Lewiston, New York: 
The Edwin Mullen Press, 2000), 2. 
15 
 
The total number of women enslaved by the Japanese is 
often estimated at 100,000 to 200,000, with approximately 
30% not surviving their experience.22  Women from colonized 
Korea comprised the vast majority of the group, 
approximately 80%, but the Japanese also drafted women from 
Taiwan, China, Philippines, Burma, Thailand and the Dutch 
East Indies (Indonesia).23  These women mostly consisted of 
young females, as young as 13, from lower class, poor 
families.   
The Japanese employed several schemes to entrap these 
girls, usually involving local subcontractors to broker the 
deals.  While all of the methods utilized deceit as its 
base, the most popular means of recruitment, especially in 
Korea, involved promising the women opportunities for 
factory work in Japan with a decent wage or even an 
education.  These women initially entered the arrangement 
freely, believing that they would be able to provide for 
themselves and their families.24  One 17 year old girl 
recounts her experience of being drafted by a Korean man, 
Oh, for work in a silk factory: 
He added that the factory would pay travel 
expenses and that many girls would be going.  He 
also said that I could leave at any time if I 
didn’t like the work there.  Oh came and asked me 
if I wanted to go, and I answered that I would 
like to, given such good terms.25 
                     22 Schmidt, 2. 
23 Chunghee Sarah Soh, “Human rights and humanity: The case of the 
‘Comfort Women,’” The Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) 
Lectures, No. 98-1204-CSSb, 04 December 1998, 
www.icasinc.org/lectures/css11998.html, accessed 10 April 2005. 
24 Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual slavery and 
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Eventually, however, they wound up in various comfort 
stations, not working for wages in a factory as promised.  
Similarly, yet not as frequently, some families exchanged 
their daughters for a fee, based on the same false premise 
that their daughters would be working in factories, not in 
comfort stations.26  In a third method, most commonly 
practiced in China and the Philippines, the women were 
simply abducted off of the streets.27  Regardless of how the 
women were gathered, they were not prepared for their 
ultimate destination. 
Once the women were dispersed to the various comfort 
stations throughout the Japanese Army posts, they were 
medically examined and then forced to allow the Japanese 
soldiers to rape them repeatedly.  Hwang Kum-ju was one of 
the first women to testify in public. 
There were so many soldiers.  Sometimes, we had 
to do it with twenty to thirty soldiers a day.I 
think ours was the only comfort station in that 
area, and soldiers and officers came whenever 
they had some spare moments.  Higher-ups came 
freely, and at night, we usually slept with 
officers. Women who contracted venereal diseases 
were simply left to die or shot.  Anyone 
resisting the advances of the men was beaten.28 
As another woman recounts, 
Twelve soldiers raped me in quick succession, 
after which I was given half an hour rest.  Then 
twelve more soldiers followed.  They all lined up 
outside the room waiting for their turn.  The 
next morning, I was too weak to get up…I could 
                     26 Tanaka, 42. 
27 Ibid., 45-48. 
28 Hyun Sook Kim,  “History and memory: The “Comfort Women” 
controversy,” in Positions East Asia culture critique: Special issue 
The Comfort Women colonialism, war and sex, ed. Chungmoo Choi, volume 5 
number 1 Spring 1997 (Duke University Press, 1997), 96-97.  
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not eat.  I felt much pain….  I could not resist 
the soldiers because they might kill me.  So what 
else could I do?  Every day, from two in the 
afternoon to ten in the evening, the soldiers 
lined up outside my room and the rooms of the six 
other women there…29 
Women who did resist were beaten, stabbed or killed.30  
The Japanese government established these military 
brothels as a result of lessons learned from previous 
campaigns.  The unruly advance into the Chinese city of 
Nanking in 1937 resulted in the looting of the city and the 
raping and killing of many of the civilian population.  The 
military and government leaders felt that by providing 
women for their soldiers, they would not be as likely to 
rape the civilian women of the towns they overtook, thereby 
lessening the amount of antagonism that the civilians felt 
toward their conquerors.31  The military authorities also 
believed that providing the comfort women for the use of 
their soldiers would increase troop morale and reduce the 
amount of unauthorized absences of the soldiers, thereby 
keeping them on the front lines.32  Additionally, by 
establishing a controlled environment that was free of 
sexually transmitted diseases, as the women were regularly 
checked, the army increased the health and well being of 
their troops.33 
At the conclusion of World War II, the military 
brothels were disbanded, and the women were allowed to 
return to their homes.  However, the Tokyo War Crime 
                     
29 Kim, 1. 
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Tribunal held no Japanese official accountable for his 
actions against the Comfort Women, and the women themselves 
did not speak out against their captors.34  The only 
military tribunal to try Japanese soldiers occurred in 
current day Jakarta, where the court convicted several 
Japanese military officers of forcing approximately 35 
Dutch women into the comfort stations.35  For the women, 
returning home often did not bring happiness.  Asian 
culture placed a very high value upon virginity; it was an 
unmarried woman’s greatest asset.  Any encounter prior to 
marriage brought great shame upon the woman and 
significantly reduced her worth.  As a result, as these 
comfort women returned to their families, they could not 
share their experiences, leaving them unable to heal 
emotionally.36  As one woman shared, “From that time (the 
time of her escape) I have lived a life of avoiding people 
out of fear of having to reveal my disgraceful past.  I 
decided not to marry because I was so ashamed of my past.”37  
Therefore, the existence of the Comfort Women remained 
hidden until the late 1980s, when Korean women began to 
speak out about their experiences.  In 1991, a group of 
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Japanese government demanding compensation for the 
violations of human rights under Japanese colonial rule 
that were committed against Korean citizens.38   
This lawsuit directly resulted from the denial in 1990 
by the Japanese government of official involvement in the 
recruitment of comfort women.39  This rhetoric also effected 
the formation of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted 
for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, i.e., the Korean 
Council, a group that has played a prominent role in 
seeking justice for these women.  This group has lobbied 
for an official apology, reparations, admittance of guilt, 
and the inclusion of the occurrence included in teachings 
in schools. 
By the mid-1990s, the Japanese government admitted 
culpability and official involvement in the recruitment and 
use of comfort women.  Nevertheless, they continue to 
assert that they are not responsible for paying reparations 
to the women because any legal responsibility for 
compensations was settled through the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China and other 
bilateral treaties with individual countries.40  However, 
the government did create the Asian Women’s Fund, which 
functions as a non-profit foundation and uses a combination 
of government funds and private donations to provide 
financial support and programs for each survivor and to 
                     38 Chunghee Sarah Soh, “The Comfort Women Project,” 
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sustain activities that address the issue of violence 
against women.  The women who accept atonement money from 
the AWF also receive a written apology from the prime 
minister on behalf of the government, “expressing apologies 
and remorse directly to each former ‘comfort woman.’”41  
Government officials maintain that they support the Asian 
Women’s Fund (AWF) out of a moral responsibility, since all 
legal obligations have already been concluded through the 
various bilateral treaties.42   
Despite this proffer of government monetary support, 
many of the former comfort women still reject the atonement 
money from the AWF.  These women maintain that the Japanese 
government has managed to give an appearance of support and 
remorse, while actually not accepting full responsibility 
for the heinous nature of the crimes committed against the 
women.43  By emphasizing the moral nature of their response, 
it negates the legal aspect of the comfort women system 
falling into the war crime category.  Additionally, the 
apology issued contains vague language concerning remorse 
and concerns over “women’s honor and dignity,”44 while 
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failing to mention that the horrors committed were the 
direct result of Japan’s aggressive actions and 
colonization of the region.   
Additionally, in April 2007, Japan’s Supreme Court 
ruled on the first set of lawsuits concerning the Comfort 
Women.  Although several lawsuits have been working through 
the appeal process, this first case to reach the Supreme 
Court concerned two young Chinese girls who were abducted 
and forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese military 
during World War II over a period of several months.  The 
Court ruled in favor of the Japanese government, stating 
that the 1972 Communiqué with China, in which Beijing 
renounced the paying of war reparations by Tokyo, absolved 
the Japanese government of any future monetary claims.  As 
a result, the individuals were not entitled to individual 
legal reparations.45   
The issue of comfort women remains unresolved in Asia 
today.  These women seek redress from the Japanese 
government, while the government believes that it does not 
owe anything more to them.  The latest round of statements 
from former Japanese Prime Minister Abe in March 2007 
belies of intentions of recanting the 1993 admission of 
official military involvement in the recruitment of women.  
While still apologizing to the comfort women, Abe denied 
that the military had forced these women into sexual 
slavery, stating that “there is no evidence to prove there 
was coercion, nothing to support it.”46  As a result, the 
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Comfort Women issue remains an area of contention in the 
normalization of relations between Japan and her neighbors.   
2. Rape of Nanking 
In December of 1937, Japanese troops rolled into the 
city of Nanking, China, a thriving city on the Yangtze 
River that was then serving as the capital of China.  With 
the Japanese army and navy looming over the city, the 
Chinese government under Chiang Kai-Shek vacated Nanking to 
establish a new capital up the river.  Over the next six 
weeks, Japanese soldiers, unencumbered by oversight from 
their leaders, systematically looted homes and shops, raped 
approximately 20,000 women and girls, and slaughtered 
anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 civilians in the city.47  
This episode defines one of the most contentious historical 
issues in Sino-Japanese relations, and its treatment 
provides a basis for the difficulties they still experience 
in mending ties.   
In 1928, the Chinese government transferred its 
capital to the city of Nanking from Peking.  The 
organization of the capital in a new city resulted in a 
large influx of government personnel and infrastructure, 
representatives and outposts from several foreign nations, 
and foreign aid workers and missionaries.  As a result, the 
population of the city nearly quadrupled in size, to total 
about one million people, by the mid-1930s.48  This number 
also included thousands of refugees that had fled their 
                     47 “Chinese City remembers Japanese ‘Rape of Nanjing,’” 13 December 
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homes as the Japanese armies continued inland.  Thus, with 
the Japanese armies advancing upon Nanking from multiple 
directions in November 1937 and with a lack of order within 
the city itself due to the recent departure of the Chinese 
government, a group of Westerners, working under the 
auspices of the Red Cross, formed a Safety Zone to protect 
the refugees and civilian population of the city.49  A map 
depicting the area and a letter delineating its intent was 
passed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese 
Expeditionary Army, who replied that “he was duly 
informed,”50 and that “if there are no Chinese army and 
military institutions in the refugee zone, then the 
Japanese army will not willfully attack it.”51   
However, when the Japanese soldiers entered the city 
on 13 December 1937 and for the next six weeks, they 
committed a litany of atrocities against the civilians of 
Nanking, breaking both humanitarian law and the 
international law of armed conflict.  These actions include 
the mass execution of Chinese citizens, the looting and 
burning of shops and homes, and the raping of women and 
girls that occurred both in and outside of the established 
Safety Zone.52    
Dr. Robert Wilson, an American surgeon working in a 
hospital in Nanking during the siege, chronicled the event 
in a series of letters to his family.  He commented that  
                     49 Xu Zhigeng, Lest we forget: Nanjing massacre, 1937, (Beijing, 
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the slaughter of civilians is appalling.  I could 
go on for pages telling of the cases of rape and 
brutality almost beyond belief….  Murder by the 
wholesale and rape by the thousands of cases.  
There seems to be no stop to the ferocity, lust, 
and atavism of the brutes.53 
In one instance, the Japanese troops arrested anyone 
considered to be a Chinese soldier and sent them all to an 
area outside of the city, where they were all 
systematically shot with machine guns.  Those who survived 
were bayoneted.54  In other cases, the Japanese entered 
homes and shops at will, looting and vandalizing at will.  
The Nanking International Safety Zone Committee estimated 
that the Japanese looted approximately 73 percent of 
Nanking’s buildings, burned 24 percent of the city, and 
burned 40 percent of peasant houses and crops.55  
Additionally, Miner Searle Bates, an American minister 
living in Nanking and highly involved in the establishment 
of the Safety Zone, penned daily letters to the Japanese 
Embassy in which he depicted the events occurring in the 
city walls and asked for help to quell the violence.   
It is said on every street with tears and 
distress that where the Japanese Army is, no 
person and no house can be safe.  Surely this is 
not what the statesmen of Japan wish to do, and 
all the residents of Nanking expect better things 
from Japan….This letter is written in a courteous 
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the unhappy despair in which we have lived since 
the Japanese Army invaded the city five days ago.  
Immediate remedy is greatly needed.56 
The major violence ended after the first six weeks, 
although the Japanese held the city until the end of World 
War II.  Unlike other atrocities, the Tokyo War Crime 
Tribunal prosecuted the Japanese leaders immediately 
responsible for the soldiers who committed these actions in 
Nanking.  However, the incident still invokes great passion 
and controversy among the citizens and governments of both 
China and Japan. 
3. Biological and Chemical Warfare 
In 1932, the Japanese government established a base 
near Harbin, a metropolitan city in the northeast corner of 
China.  They used the facility for the development of 
chemical and biological weapons and for the research and 
practice of battlefield surgery techniques.  Known as Unit 
731 and headed by Lt General Ishii Shiro, the scientists 
and doctors stationed in the unit utilized members of the 
local population and Chinese soldiers to conduct their 
multiple experiments and test their theories.57  The unit 
was disbanded at the defeat of the Japanese in 1945.  
However, none of the members of Unit 731 or any members of 
the Japanese government was held accountable at the Tokyo 
War Crimes Tribunal for the atrocities committed.58  
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Additionally, several of the doctors continued to lead 
successful careers in post-war Japan.  Furthermore, 
although the Japanese have accepted responsibility for 
removing chemical weapons remaining in China, their courts 
have ruled that Japan is not responsible for paying 
reparations to victims of the experiments.59  This ruling 
upholds the belief that Japan has completed all moral 
responsibilities to it victims from its aggression in Asia 
and lends credence to lack of necessity that the Japanese 
feel to issue any more of a concrete apology to its 
neighbors.  
The Japanese Imperial government established Unit 731 
in order to conduct research into chemical and biological 
warfare methods and battlefield surgery techniques.  
Historians estimate that Unit 731 killed anywhere from 3000 
to 12,000 of the local populace60 in conducting their 
research and that the biological weapons developed at the 
base were responsible for up to 250,000 deaths in China 
alone.61  The subjects, referred to as “maruta,” or wooden 
logs, mostly consisted of Chinese soldiers and civilians 
brought in from the surrounding fields and towns but also 
included some captured Russians, British and Americans.62  
Researchers conducted multiple types of experiments on the 
subjects to test different effects of viri and bacteria and 
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to trace the effects of different elemental conditions on 
the human body.  In some of these tests, the scientists 
would freeze subjects alive to analyze frostbite, burn them 
alive to track human combustion, place them into vacuum 
chambers and hang them by their ankles to watch the body 
react.63  In other experiments, the researchers would infect 
the individuals with different diseases, such as the 
plague, cholera and anthrax, track the progress of the 
diseases through the body, and then dissect the infected 
while alive to annotate the internal damage to the body by 
the disease.64  The Japanese Army then transferred practices 
developed at Unit 731 to numerous cities in China for both 
field tests and biological attacks.  In several cases, they 
dropped plague infested rats and sacks filled with fleas, 
rice and wheat into cities, handed out treats and food 
latent with bacteria, and infected local water supplies.65   
The members of Unit 731 did not limit their 
experimentation to chemical and biological warfare.  They 
also expanded their research to practice and improve 
techniques for battlefield surgery.66  In this area, 
surgeons would perform vivisections on Chinese captives.  
Dr. Yuasa Ken, an army surgeon, who later served as chief 
of general affairs at the hospital noted that: 
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It was never the case that we used prisoners for 
vivisection just because there were extra 
prisoners available.  It was always, ‘We need 
them, so get them for us.’  They were necessary 
for surgery practice in order to save the lives 
of Japanese soldiers, you see.  Chinese people 
were arrested for that purpose alone.67 
The surgeons used these opportunities to practice 
techniques that they would learn in the field and performed 
procedures ranging from appendectomies to amputations to 
bowel resections.68 
The conclusion of World War II brought an end to the 
activities at Unit 731.  However, the Tokyo Tribunal did 
not charge any members of Unit 731, including Lt General 
Ishii, or any other government leader for these atrocities, 
and Japanese leaders have since failed to offer an apology 
related specifically to the actions at Unit 731.  
Additionally, the Japanese government did not acknowledge 
the existence of the program or accept responsibility until 
a 2004 Tokyo High Court ruling stated that Japan did have a 
biochemical weapons facility in China, whose “main 
objective was to research, develop and manufacture 
biological weapons.”69  However, the Court did not require 
the government to pay indemnities to individuals affected 
by the activities of Unit 731, arguing that a national 
government is not responsible for reparations to an 
                     67 Noda Masaaki, “One Army surgeon’s account of vivisection on human 
subjects in China,” in The search for justice: Japanese war crimes, ed. 
Peter Li, trans. Paul Schalow, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003), 148. 
68 Masaaki, 146-154. 
69 Matthew Forney and Velisarios Kattoulas, “Black Death,” Time Asia 
Magazine, 09 September 2002, 
www.time.com/time/asaia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501020909-
346284,00.html, accessed 22 August 2004. 
29 
 
individual and that any monetary compensation issues were 
resolved by previous treaties with government entities.70   
Although the Japanese government has taken 
responsibility for removal and destruction of the remaining 
weapons,71 the actions of Unit 731 and the lack of a 
specific apology by the Japanese government engenders much 
animosity from the Chinese toward the Japanese and adds one 
more layer of controversy between Japan and its neighbors. 
C. TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIALS 
From 1946 through 1948, the Allied Forces convened war 
trials in Tokyo to prosecute the leaders of the Imperial 
Japanese government and military forces at the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East.  More 
commonly known as the Tokyo war crimes trial or the Tokyo 
tribunal, these proceedings focused on the main criminals 
and some lower echelon war criminals, allowing local 
military tribunals to handle the majority of the accused.  
Led primarily by the United States, the Tokyo tribunal, for 
the most part, did hold Japanese leaders accountable for 
their actions in Asia.  However, the trials did not 
satisfactorily account for all of the atrocities that 
occurred, the actual administration of the trials had 
multiple shortcomings, and the resulting negative effects 
have lasting implications in Asia today. 
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1. Background of Trials 
Upon the conclusion of World War II in Asia, the 
Allied Powers opted to follow the example set at the trials 
at Nuremberg that processed Nazi leaders for “crimes 
against humanity,” while opting to add the charge of 
“crimes against peace.”72  Spearheaded by the United States, 
as the leading vested party in Japan, the Allied Forces 
formed the Tokyo tribunal to prosecute the major players of 
Japan’s Imperial Government and its military.  The 
conglomerate of Allied prosecutors, headed by American 
Joseph Keenan, divided the accused into three distinct 
categories based on the magnitude of their crimes.  Broadly 
defined, “Class A” criminals, the highest level, included 
those who committed “crimes against peace,” “Class B” 
defined those who committed “crimes against humanity,” and 
“Class C” included individuals accused of more direct 
involvement, including higher level planning, authorizing 
or failing to prevent the atrocities.73  The Tokyo tribunal 
focused its efforts primarily on the “Class A” criminals.  
 Additionally, victor nations held approximately 50 
military tribunals at various locations throughout Asia.  
These trials, which occurred between 1945 and 1949, 
indicted 5700 individuals for “Class B/C” war crimes.74  
These tribunals levied most of their charges against 
enlisted personnel and against a few officers for specific 
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crimes against prisoners, in direct conflict to the makeup 
of the personnel indicted by the Tokyo tribunal, which 
limited its constituents to the top level leaders of the 
war effort.75  Of these Japanese charged by the outlaying 
tribunals, 4403 received some form of punishment, including 
the execution of 920, the acquittal of 1018, and never 
trying 279.76  Although these military trials held the 
actual perpetrator of the war crimes personally 
responsible, they received no attention in Japan or in its 
neighboring countries.  This lack of public knowledge and 
proliferation of evidence and trial results greatly 
enhanced the sentiment outside of Japan that the Japanese 
were not sufficiently punished for their actions.  Inside 
the country, this inaction failed to provide the Japanese 
citizens exposure to the full spectrum of events that had 
occurred outside of the country.77 
Although the Tokyo trials received a great deal of 
press both inside Japan and in the international community, 
the process and the eventual outcomes did nothing to alter 
these pressing sentiments.  With the singular focus on 
prosecuting the leaders, the “Class A” criminals, the Tokyo 
tribunal convened on May 3, 1946 and did not pass down its 
verdicts until the November of 1948.  The 11 member bench 
consisted of eight Westerners and only three Asians.  In a 
majority vote of seven to four, the court found 25 military 
and government leaders guilty and sentenced seven of them 
to death, sixteen to life imprisonment and two to shorter 
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prison sentences.78  The seven, who were hanged, most 
notably included General Iwane Matsui, whose troops were 
responsible for the Rape of Nanking, and General Hideki 
Tojo, the prime minister of Japan from 1941-1945, who 
claimed responsibility for all military and political 
actions of Japan.  Both of these individuals are now 
interred at the Yasukuni Shrine.79 
2. Failures of Trials 
However noble the intent of the trials, they failed to 
address critical aspects of the atrocities committed by the 
Japanese.  First, the trials omitted several key incidents 
that occurred during the Japanese campaign.  Both the 
retention and use of Comfort Women and the testing 
conducted by Unit 731 were absent during all trial 
proceedings.80  The prosecutors did not include either event 
in charges against the war criminals, nor did they raise 
them as evidence within the trials themselves.  In fact, Lt 
General Ishii Shiro, commander of Unit 731, escaped 
prosecution in exchange for conferring the results of his 
unit’s work to the United States.81  Also, although 
prosecutors did charge members for the atrocities committed 
during the Nanking Massacre, the evidence was not released 
to the public.82  Additionally, the existence of language 
barriers, the lack of availability of trial transcripts to 
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Japanese public, and the lengthy 31 months of trials 
resulted in a Japan that was separated from the entire 
process.  By the time the verdict was announced, in 
November 1948, the perspectives of both the world and Japan 
had changed greatly; former allies were now actively 
divided by political ideologies, and Japan was deeply 
involved in a solid recovery from the war.  As a result, it 
was very easy for the Japanese people to become removed 
from trials.83     
Second, the conduct of the trials and its ultimate 
outcomes left many Japanese and neighboring countries with 
the sense that the trials provided an opportunity for the 
exercise of “victor’s justice.”84  This sentiment arose 
primarily because of the seemingly hypocritical nature of 
various aspects of the trials.  First, the composition of 
the justices promoted this sense of victor’s justice, due 
to the primarily Western composition of the court.85  The 
Asian community, the victim of Japan’s aggression, was only 
represented initially by China.  Eventually, two more 
judges, one from India and one from the Philippines, were 
added to provide some counterbalance to the bench.  Since 
Korea was still a protectorate of Japan, it was not 
considered a sovereign nation, and therefore did not 
warrant an individual seat on the bench.  The bench also 
included a member from the Soviet Union.  The inclusion of 
the Soviet Union in the trial process offended the 
Japanese.  They argued that the Soviet entry into the war 
against Japan in 1945 violated the Neutrality Pact that 
                     83 Dower, 453-454, 469. 
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both countries had signed in 1940.  Since the Japanese 
believed that the Soviet Union had committed the same act 
for which they, themselves, were now being tried, they felt 
it was hypocritical for the Soviets to pass judgment on 
them.86  As a result, the presence of the Soviet judge 
furthered the notion of “victor’s justice.”   
Furthermore, many Japanese and several of the 
dissenting judges felt that countries who had engaged in 
colonization and who still actively governed colonies had 
no right to try Japan for exhibiting similar traits in 
acquiring the land of its neighbors.87  For example, the 
British did not relinquish their colonial control of India 
until the trials were already in progress.  The Indian 
representative on the bench, Justice Roling Pal, in 
referring to Japan’s takeover of Manchuria, noted that “it 
would be pertinent to recall to our memory that the 
majority of the interests claimed by the Western 
Prosecuting Powers in the Eastern Hemisphere including 
China were acquired by such aggressive measures.”88   
 Additionally, the proceedings lost merit due to 
actions that occurred in the decade after the war.  By 
1957, all of the “Class A” convicted felons, who had been 
sentenced to prison terms vice execution, had had their 
sentences commuted by the countries that had comprised the 
Allied powers.89  Furthermore, two members of this group 
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achieved significant success in the Japanese government.  
Kishi Nobusuke was elected as Japan’s Prime Minister in 
1957, and Mamoru Shigemitsu served as a foreign minister in 
1954.  The rise of convicted war felons left two distinct 
impressions on Japan and her neighbors.  For the Japanese, 
it furthered the notion that they had paid for their wrong 
doings during the war, and for her neighbors, it buoyed 
their belief that for the Japanese, aggression did not 
result in punishment.90  These sentiments have added to the 
difficulty in normalizing relations between Japan and her 
neighbors. 
Third, although the Tokyo tribunal did convict several 
high ranking Japanese leaders, it did not prosecute the 
Emperor, Hirohito.  In fact, the prosecution was under 
strict orders not even to allow the mention of the 
emperor’s name during testimony.91  While admitting his own 
personal responsibility for actions taken during the war, 
General Tojo additionally testified that “none of us 
(Japanese) would dare act against the emperor’s will.”92  
However, within a week, Tojo recanted his previous 
testimony and countered with a second statement indicating 
Emperor Hirohito’s past and present desire for peace.93  By 
resting blame for Japan’s aggression squarely on the 
shoulders of its military leaders, the Allied Forces were 
able to argue that the emperor was merely an ill-advised 
figure head, who was led astray by his zealous advisors.  
Leaving the emperor blameless and removing the mantle of                      90 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
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responsibility from him enabled the Allied Forces to leave 
him as a figurative leader in Japan to promote stability 
during the dismantling of the Meiji state and the building 
of a democratic one.94  This transformation required that 
Emperor Hirohito renounce his position as a deity and 
accept that of a human as the “symbol of national unity,” 
thereby separating the Shinto religion from the affairs of 
government.95   
The retention of the emperor also functioned to uphold 
the order that had been established by the Allied forces in 
Japan.  General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Powers (SCAP), noted that arresting Emperor 
Hirohito would require a million men to maintain order in 
Japan and that “civilized practices would largely cease, 
and a condition of underground chaos and guerilla warfare 
in mountainous and outlying regions would result.”96  
Furthermore, the Japanese soldiers and sailors had just 
waged a war across Asia in the name of Emperor Hirohito.  
By removing the responsibility for the war from him and 
transferring it solely to the military and policy advisors, 
the Japanese citizens, who identified with their emperor 
and fought for him, could be innocent, too.97  Thus, this 
transference of responsibility has helped to increase the 
difficulty in today’s society of reconciling the tensions 
between Japan and her neighbors. 
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Overall, the trials held Japan accountable for its 
aggressive actions in Asia prior to and during World War 
II, and they administered punishment to the senior leaders.  
However, several facets of the trials ultimately promoted 
difficulties within Japan and neighboring countries.  The 
length and lack of public knowledge about the processes of 
the trials, the prevalent sense of “victor’s justice” 
experienced by multiple countries, and the placement of 
blame on the military had an impact that still affects 
Japan, China and the Republic of Korea today.  As these 
countries work to normalize relations, the idea of the 
definition of an appropriate apology continues to plague 
their efforts.   
D. POST-WAR RECOVERY  
Concurrent with the conduct of the Tokyo tribunal, the 
reconstruction of its cities and infrastructures occupied 
Japan.  While the Japanese citizens focused on rebuilding 
their individual lives, the Allied forces, placed under the 
command of General Douglas MacArthur, began to breakdown 
the Meiji State and replace it with a more democratic form 
of government.  Since the United States had been the 
country most heavily involved in the Pacific War, it played 
a vital role in the post-war transition of the Japanese 
governing structure.   
1. The New “Peace” Constitution 
The Meiji government formed in the late 1860s, 
culminating from the civil war and the subsequent overthrow 
of the feudal system.  The new government established 
itself as a constitutional monarchy, adopting nominal 
western political, military and judicial systems and 
38 
 
uniting the country under the name of the emperor through 
the adoption of a constitution.  The Meiji Constitution 
served as the centerpiece of Imperial Japan, and it 
reestablished the role of the emperor as the gods’ divine 
representative on earth.98  Therefore, by linking the 
beliefs of the Shinto religion into the affairs of state, 
the leaders provided a means for all of the different 
factions to unite.  In fact, the Fifth Article of the 
Charter Oath stipulated that “knowledge shall be sought 
throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of 
imperial rule.”99  Additionally, the leaders of the new 
Meiji government formed an imperial army that linked 
conscripted service to the state as service to the emperor 
himself, creating a bond of nationalist pride and military 
service.100   
In forming a post-war Japanese government, MacArthur 
needed to remove both of these institutions from the 
constitution and from actual practices, while still 
establishing a stable functioning governing structure.101  
He accomplished this feat by maintaining the same 
parliamentary system and by drafting a new constitution 
that removed the military component and intent to wage war 
and established the emperor as a symbol, separate from 
constitutional authority.  Known as the “Peace 
Constitution,” Article 9 states that the “Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as means of settling 
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international disputes.”102  In order to provide assurance 
that Japan would not take up arms, the Constitution also 
stipulates that the government would not form any military 
forces that could be used to assert its positions outside 
of its borders.103   
Having removed the potential for military capability, 
MacArthur also needed to ensure that the role of the 
emperor transitioned to one that only involved 
participation in ceremonial duties and not in actual 
government.104  Retaining the emperor was an essential 
aspect of maintaining order in the post-war society.  
However, in order to establish a functioning constitutional 
government, General MacArthur needed to remove both the 
Shinto religion and the emperor from the governing 
institutions.105  Therefore, Article 4 of the new 
constitution provides that “the Emperor shall perform only 
such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this 
Constitution and he shall not have powers related to 
government.”106  Thus, by providing a new constitution that 
excised the military and the emperor’s divinity, MacArthur 
established a path for future development for Japan that 
would be based on a fully democratic system and status as a 
peaceful nation. 
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2. Japan’s Revitalization 
However, as the United States led Japan through its 
post-war reconstruction, international dynamics began to 
change.  1949 saw the successful testing of an atomic bomb 
by the Soviet Union and the victory of the communist party 
in China.  A year later, with the Soviet Union firmly 
entrenched above the 38th parallel in northern Korea, war 
broke out between the two governing bodies on the Korean 
peninsula.  With the encroachment of communism into Asia, 
the United States believed that democracy needed to be 
preserved and furthered in the region.107  As a result, 
American leaders began to push for the revitalization of 
Japan’s economy in order to create a stronghold for 
democracy in Asia.  Thus, the repentant phase of Japan’s 
recovery was short lived.  The United States ended its 
occupation in 1950, and in September 1951, 48 democratic 
countries signed a peace treaty at a formal peace 
conference in San Francisco.  Coming into effect in April 
1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty restored sovereignty 
to Japan, while keeping the country under the umbrella of 
the United States.108   
E. CONCLUSION 
The aggression of the Japanese in Asia prior to and 
throughout World War II resulted in strained relationships 
with its closest neighbors, China and the Republic of 
Korea.  The commitment of several atrocities, including 
comfort women, Rape of Nanking and the chemical/biological 
experimentation of Unit 731, and the means in which these 
actions were addressed at the Tokyo tribunal have further                      107 Bix, 625, 635. 
108 Bix, 647-648. 
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hindered Japan’s ability to normalize relations.  The 
decision of the Tokyo tribunal to charge only a few, 
specific “Class A” war criminals with “crimes against 
peace,” did not promote an overarching sense of guilt 
throughout Japan.  The Trials also failed to garner much 
weight with the Japanese and the neighboring China and the 
Republic of Korea because of the complete omission of 
atrocities as the Comfort Women and the Chemical/Biological 
testing, the sense of “victor’s justice,” and the lack of 
prosecution of then Emperor, Hirohito.  Furthermore, the 
revitalization of Japan’s economy only a few years after 
the war’s end, coupled with its normalization at the San 
Francisco Peace Conference in the early have increased the 
difficulty for Japan to deal with her past properly in 
order to move forward today.109  
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III. IMPACTS OF APOLOGY ON JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
ROLE 
Since the revitalization of its economy in the 1950s, 
Japan has become a top world player in the economic realm.  
Despite an economic downturn in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, in 2007, Japan ranked second behind the United 
States in nominal gross domestic product, at 4.4 trillion 
US dollars and third in purchasing power parity at 6.6%, 
just after the United States and China.110  Although an 
economic powerhouse, current Japanese leaders desire to 
expand its diplomatic influence and “to make every effort 
to expound the aims of Japan’s diplomacy and ensure that 
these aims are transmitted at home and overseas.”111   
Already a major contributor within the region through 
its participation in organizations such as Six Party talks, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN 
Plus Three), the Japanese government is amending its 
foreign policy agenda to add a focus on spreading the 
values of freedom, democracy and human rights from Northern 
Europe through the Middle East to Northeast Asia, while 
still maintaining its stance as a “nation of peace.”  Key 
steps to achieve this aim include amending Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution, seeking a permanent seat on the 
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United Nations Security Council, actively participating in 
Gulf War II, and increasing monetary aid and peacekeeping 
endeavors to foreign countries through the United Nations 
and through the directed efforts of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).   
However, before Japan can achieve success outside of 
its region, it must first address the treatment of the 
outstanding issues remaining from World War II.  
Additionally, Japan’s neighbors, most notably China and the 
Republic of Korea, do not accept the apologies voiced by 
various Japanese leaders and prime ministers as being 
sincere.  This lack of trust is reflected in both the 
controversy of historical accounts of World War II in 
history textbooks, in the visits of national leaders to the 
Yasukuni War Shrine, and in the lack of reparations to the 
victims of the aggression.  Also, these issues, coupled 
with a rise in Japanese nationalism, incite great animosity 
and subsequent nationalist movements in Japan’s neighboring 
countries, furthering the difficulty in normalizing 
relations.   
A. JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA 
1. Traditional Role 
Historically, Japan has embraced its role as a “Nation 
of Peace,” based on Article 9 of its Constitution and on 
its lack of military action in over 60 years.  In that 
endeavor, Tokyo’s traditional foreign policy objectives 
have included three pillars: diplomatic support of the 
United Nations, collaboration with Free World Nations, and 
adherence to its position as an Asian nation.112  As a 
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member of several key organizations, Japan plays an active 
role in regional and international affairs of state.  
Participation in regional activities, such as APEC, ASEAN 
Plus Three and Six Party Talks, allows Japan to influence 
cooperation and direction of significant regional matters 
and areas of concern, both economically and diplomatically.  
Japan’s membership in the G8 and the United Nations (UN), 
including service as a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, expands its participation into areas 
outside of the Asian-Pacific realm and lays the ground work 
for future changes in Japan’s foreign policy goals.  
Additionally, Japan is the world’s second largest 
contributor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
donating 13.1 billion US dollars in 2005.113  
2. Changes in Foreign Policy Goals 
Japan’s leaders have taken actions that have served to 
extend Japan’s influence into areas outside of economic and 
regional policy spheres.  In November 2006, then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Aso Taro announced the addition of a 
fourth pillar to Japan’s foreign policy objectives.  This 
new vision, as outlined in the 2007 Diplomatic Bluebook, 
would create “a region of stability and plenty with its 
basis in universal values such as freedom, democracy, 
fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and the market 
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economy and creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.”114  
The intent of this new direction is to provide developing 
countries, stretching from Northern Europe through the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, with 
political stability and economic prosperity through 
peaceful means.115  In order to accomplish this goal 
successfully, Japan has taken steps to alter its 
interaction in the international arena. 
a. Amendment of Article 9 
First, Japanese lawmakers have proposed 
legislation to amend Article 9 of the Constitution.  
Article 9 currently prohibits Japan from maintaining 
military forces that would enable the country to assert 
itself outside of its borders, and it renounces Tokyo’s 
right to use force or wage war.  However, both major 
parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), interpret the 
constitution to allow for self defense forces for use to 
thwart off any external attack and as an extension of the 
police force to uphold internal discipline.116  In support 
of this interpretation, Japan currently employs 240,000 
personnel in its Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense 
Forces.   
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However, in May 2007, the Diet passed the 
National Referendum Law to alter Article 9.  Deliberations 
will occur for three years, until May 2010, on the exact 
wording and inclusions in the referendum.  Altering the 
Constitution requires a two thirds majority in both Houses 
of the Diet, which will necessitate cooperation from both 
of the major parties, and a simple majority in a national 
referendum.  While the LDP and the DSP agree, in general, 
for the necessity to amend Article 9, they do not concur on 
the specifics for inclusion within the bill.  Furthermore, 
while polls demonstrate that approximately half of Japan’s 
population supports the amendment,117 “there are people 
among the general public who fear that revising the 
Constitution will turn (Japan back) into a prewar militant 
nation,”118 according to Hideo Otake, a political science 
professor at Doshisha Women’s College of Liberal Arts.  A 
change in Article 9 also instills fear in Japan’s 
neighboring countries.  Chinese citizens still labor under 
a healthy mistrust of the Japanese as a result of the 
perceived lack of remorse from actions in World War II, and 
they believe that a Japan in possession of military 
capability would reform into a militaristic society.119   
b. Bid for UNSC Permanent Seat 
Intrinsically linked to the revision of Article 9 
is Japan’s desire for a permanent seat on the United 
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Nations Security Council (UNSC).  Japan has served on the 
UNSC as a non-permanent member for a total of 18 years 
since its acceptance into the UN in 1956, with its most 
recent stint in 2005-2006.  In his policy speech in January 
2008 to the 169th Session of the Diet, Japanese Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda expressed that Japan was a “Peace 
Fostering Nation,” and  
in order to fulfill its role as a “Peace 
Fostering Nation,” Japan needs to broaden the 
stage where it conducts its diplomatic 
activities. For this, we will pursue the goal of 
becoming a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council and will work towards United 
Nations reform.120 
However, while Japan has embraced a role as a 
peace building nation, its desire for a permanent seat in 
the UNSC raises doubts in the international community.  One 
vital aspect of the UNSC is its authority to impose 
sanctions and military actions upon other nations.  As a 
permanent member, Japan, without a military force, would be 
able to vote for action against another country, yet its 
own troops would not participate in that mission.  In fact, 
Japan’s current guidance, the International Peace 
Cooperation Law enacted in 1992, delineates specific 
requirements in order for the Self Defense Forces to 
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parties must be in a cease-fire and allow Japanese 
presence, that Japan can withdraw troops at any time, and 
that Japanese forces will only fire in self defense.121  
While these provisions are quite advantageous for 
Japanese troops, they are not beneficial for the other 
countries conducting the UN action and greatly hinder 
support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC.  
Therefore, an amendment to Article 9 would foster support 
among other countries for Japan, yet neither action is 
endorsed by Japan’s neighbors, specifically China.  China’s 
UN Ambassador, Wang Guangya, has openly opposed the 
proposal to include Japan in the UNSC as a permanent 
member, stating that Japan has not atoned for its wartime 
past.122  However, Japanese policy makers counter that 
Japan, as the second largest monetary contributor to the UN 
at 19.5% of all annual UN funding,123 already plays a vital 
role in UN missions, regardless of any modification to 
Article 9. 
c. Contributions to Counter-terrorism Measures 
Although Japan’s constitution still reflects its 
peace clause, the country’s leaders have contributed to 
counter-terrorism measures through troop support.  From 
2001 to 2007 under the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law 
and then in February 2008 under the Replenishment Support 
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Special Measures Law, “Japan has been contributing to peace 
and stability of the international community by conducting 
refueling activities to vessels participating in the OEF-
MIO (Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interception 
Operations)”124 in the Indian Ocean.  By maintaining 
Maritime Self Defense Force vessels in the Indian Ocean, 
Japan provides a steady supply line for all coalition 
vessels entering and exiting the Arabian Gulf and, through 
March 2006, has supplied them with more than 110 million 
gallons of fuel and 621,000 gallons of water.125   Also from 
February 2004 through July 2006, the Japanese government 
under Prime Minister Koizumi formed the Japanese Iraq 
Reconstruction and Support Group (JIRSG), which consisted 
of 600 Ground Self Defense Forces deployed to the Southern 
Iraqi city of Samawah to support humanitarian efforts.  
These troops, the first deployed since World War II, 
assisted in reconstruction efforts for the town, including 
water purification and the restoration of public buildings.  
They did not participate in any military campaigns, were 
not permitted in combat zones and were only permitted to 
fire weapons in self defense. 
However, the deployment of forces to Iraq drew 
much ire from adversaries inside Japan.  Although the 
Koizumi government argued that JIRSG was an integral part 
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of endorsing Japan’s efforts to support humanitarian 
missions, his opponents believed that Japanese troops 
overstepped the bounds of humanitarian support by entering 
the war in Iraq and that their forces should have served in 
the UN sanctioned campaign in Afghanistan.126  Additionally, 
critics maintained that the construct of the Iraqi War made 
it difficult to discern the confines of a combat zone, 
making the participation of Japanese troops a violation of 
the constitution by shifting from a mission of providing 
aid to one of troops engaged in military action outside of 
Japan’s borders.127  Yasuo Ichikawa, a member of Japan’s 
parliament, added that “the SDF (Self Defense Force) 
deployment to Iraq wouldn’t be a problem if it really were 
for humanitarian reasons.  But it is first and foremost a 
show of support to the U.S.  The U.S. invaded Iraq without 
a U.N. resolution, and Japan is now aiding in that act.”128   
Furthermore, while this act has served to 
strengthen Japan’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat within 
North America and Europe, it did not endear Japan to its 
nearest neighbors.129  By deploying the JIRSG, Japan 
demonstrated to Western countries that it was willing to 
commit personnel as well as money to UN efforts, a concern 
of UN members in supporting Japan’s bid.  Conversely, this 
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measure fostered distrust among Japan’s World War II 
victims, most specifically from China and the Koreas, that 
Japan was expanding its area of influence without properly 
atoning for its past.   
d. Expansion of ODA  
Finally, Tokyo intends to use ODA to help achieve 
the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.”  Traditionally, Tokyo 
has relied heavily on ODA as its primary means of providing 
support to struggling countries in order to promote 
international security and prosperity and trust in Japan 
and its people, utilizing four basic measures: sustainable 
growth, support for social development, addressing global  
issues and peace building.130  In FY2006, Japan donated a 
net total of 11,187.07 million US dollars in grant aid, 
loan aid and technical cooperation131 to achieve these 
goals.  With the addition of the fourth pillar in foreign 
diplomacy goals, the use of ODA will be expanded to  
secure Japan’s national interests within a 
globalizing world by responding accurately to new 
international environment characterized by the 
rise of such countries as China and India, and 
also by planning and implementing international 
cooperation that is more closely in accordance 
with diplomatic policy.132 
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In order to accomplish this strategic alignment 
of ODA use with the advancement of national interests in 
the international community, the distribution of ODA will 
focus on enhancing infrastructures, empowering individuals, 
securing intellectual advances, promoting energy 
conservation and alternate sources and developing economic 
activity.133  By hosting the 2008 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit 
and the 4th Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development, by serving as the Chair of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission, and by contributing to Peace 
Keeping Operation Centers in Africa and Southeast Asia, 
Tokyo is already demonstrating change in this new 
direction.  
B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES FROM WORLD WAR II 
Even as Tokyo amends its foreign policy objectives to 
enhance its role in the international community, it still 
faces criticism from its neighbors for its inability to 
resolve actions from World War II.  Japan feels that it has 
adequately apologized for the atrocities committed, such as 
the Comfort Women, the Rape of Nanking and Unit 731, 
through multiple statements from prime ministers and 
through the various peace treaties it has signed with 
neighboring countries.  However, these nearest neighbors, 
specifically China and South Korea, do not believe that 
Japan has satisfactorily resolved these matters.134  They 
assert that although Tokyo has issued statements of deep                      133 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s foreign policy in 
major diplomatic fields,” (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
diplomatic blue book summary 2007, March 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter1.pdf, accessed 
01 June 2008. 
134 Roh Moo-hyun, “Asahi Shimbun interview with ROK President Roh,” 
interview by Yoichi Funabashi, Asahi Shimbun, 03 November 2007, Open 
Source Center Document ID JPP20071103004001. 
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remorse, its actions do not align with its rhetoric, as 
evidenced by the accounts of World War II in history 
textbooks, by official visits to Yasukuni Shrine and by 
lack of reparations to victims of its aggression.135   
Furthermore, they believe that a strong Japan will revert 
to its militaristic tendencies.  Therefore, as Japan 
continues to advance in the international community, its 
leaders must reach an understanding of its past that 
reconciles with its vision for the future without engaging 
the ire of its neighbors.  
1. Japan’s Apology  
First, Tokyo feels that it has offered numerous and 
adequate apologies for the atrocities it committed during 
its invasion of China and Korea.  According to the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Japan has always engraved in mind feelings of 
deep remorse and heartfelt apology with regard to 
the tremendous damage and suffering that it 
caused in the past through its colonial rule and 
aggression to the people of many countries, 
particularly those of Asian nations.  On various 
occasions, Japan has clearly expressed these 
feelings of remorse and apology, and its resolve 
to ensure that such an unfortunate history is 
never repeated…136 
Leaders in the government have issued these apologies 
during speeches, in formal meetings with the aggrieved 
nations’ leaders and in official agreements with both China 
and the Republic of Korea.  Examples of these expressed 
                     135 Sheila Smith, “Ties that bind,” South China Morning Post, 21 May 
2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 27 May 2008. 
136 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Historical issues Q&A,” 




sentiments of “heartfelt remorse” include the 1965 Republic 
of Korea-Japan Joint Communiqué, 1972 Joint Communiqué of 
the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, the 1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration 
on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for 
Peace and Development, and the 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea 
Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea 
Partnership towards the twenty-first century.    
Additionally, Prime Ministers from Tomiichi Murayama 
in 1995, Junichiro Koizumi in 2005,137 and Shinzo Abe in 
2006138 in various speeches and statements have also 
expressed “feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology” 
for the “tremendous damage and suffering to the people of 
many countries, particularly those of Asian nations, 
through its colonial rule and aggression.”139   
2. Reception by China and the Republic of Korea 
However, many Chinese and Korean citizens and 
government leaders do not believe that the expressions of 
remorse repeatedly uttered by the Japanese government are 
sincere.  They feel that Tokyo merely states the correct 
rhetoric but that the government’s treatment of key issues, 
such as accounts in history textbooks of Japanese actions 
in Korea and China prior to World War II, official state 
                     137 Junichiro Koizumi, “Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi,” 15 August 2005, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/15danwa_e.html, 
accessed 26 September 2008. 
138 Shinzo Abe, “Press conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
following his visit to China,” 08 October 
2006,http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.h
tml, accessed 12 June 2008.  
139 Tomiichi Murayama, “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 
‘On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the war’s end,’” 15 August 
1995, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html, 
accessed 07 June 2008. 
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visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the lack of reparations 
to individuals wronged by the Japanese during occupation,  
denotes its true intent.  Furthermore, this distrust is 
exacerbated by a rise in nationalism in Japan, despite 
continued assertions by government leaders of being a 
peaceful nation. 
a. Japanese Textbooks 
The first issue that earns the distrust of 
neighboring countries is the approval of history textbooks 
by the Ministry of Education that reflect a revised history 
of Japanese actions and responsibilities in Asia prior to 
and during World War II.  The Minister of Education 
directly approves every textbook that is allowed for use to 
teach students.  The Japanese textbook companies submit 
their product to the Ministry of Education, who then 
reviews them to ensure compliance with specific guidelines 
provided by the Textbook Authorization and Research 
Council.  A list of approximately eight approved textbooks 
is posted annually from which the local school systems can 
choose.140  This process ensures that the government of 
Japan is directly involved in what information is being 
disseminated in the classrooms.   
Thus, critics argue that the process ensures that 
the texts only give a cursory explanation of the events 
leading up to Japan’s defeat in 1945 and that they minimize 
the aggressive role that Japan played in many of the 
atrocities that they committed in Asia.  Specifically, they 
cite the failure of the textbooks to mention the existence 
                     140 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of 




of Comfort Women, the events of the Nanking Massacre, and 
the experimentation of Unit 731.141  For example, one of the 
approved history textbooks for use beginning in April 2006, 
New Social Studies: History (new edition),142 barely 
mentions the seizing of Nanking in December 1937: 
The fighting spread from northern China to 
central China, and by the end of the year 
Japanese forces had occupied the capital Nanking.  
In the process, a great number of Chinese 
civilians were killed, including women and 
children (the Nanking Incident).However, Chiang 
Kai-shek continued to resist the Japanese, 
transferring his base to Hankou and then to 
Chongqing.143 
The textbook also includes a footnote that 
references the Rape of Nanking: “This incident was termed 
the Nanking Massacre and criticized internationally, but 
the Japanese people were not informed about it.”144  
Additionally, the texts treat the occupation of Korea and 
the aggression into China and countries in Southeast Asia 
similarly, resulting in increased friction between the 
countries.   
This treatment of history in the textbooks is 
important not only because of the immediate impact on 
international relations but also the future of those same 
                     141 Anthony Faiola, “Japanese schoolbooks anger South Korea, China,” 
The Washington Post, 06 April 2005, ProQuest Document ID 817661671, 
accessed 10 April 2005. 
142 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan commissioned the 
translations of textbooks approved in April 2005 for use beginning in 
April 2006 into English, Chinese and Korean.  These translations 
started to become available on 31 March 2008 on the internet via the JE 
Kaleidoscope website, www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/. 
143 Tokyo Shoseki, New social studies: History (new edition), 
translated by JE Kaleidoscope, 31 March 2008, www.je-
kaleidoscope.jp/english/text5.html, accessed 03 June 2008, chapter 6 
page 20.  
144 Ibid., chapter 6 page 20. 
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relationships, as the texts and subsequent lessons learned 
affect the perspective of the leaders of future 
generations.  This lack of historical understanding 
propagated in the classrooms worries Japan’s neighbors.  Xu 
Dunxin, a former Chinese Ambassador to Japan, spoke on the 
importance of accurate accounts of history in textbooks and 
in classrooms.  He asserted that parents send their 
children to school in the hope that they will obtain a 
“bright future” and that they will learn to “engage in good 
undertakings,” 
but if the history education – particularly 
modern history education – that they get in 
school is distorted and wrong, and they have this 
sort of attitude when they do business, it is 
possible that in the future the business 
negotiations may become deadlocked or collapse.  
Therefore, such instructional materials are 
misleading people’s children, and using it to 
teach younger generations will not benefit 
them.145  
Therefore, both the Chinese and the Koreans feel 
that Japan’s failure to address these historical events 
properly in the classroom indicates that the government is 
truly not remorseful because they are not teaching their 
youth accurately. 
b. Yasukuni Shrine 
The official visits by members of the Japanese 
Diet and by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine also 
cause China and Korea to view Japan’s apologies as lacking 
sincerity.  The Yasukuni Shrine was established in 1869 by 
                     145 Xu Dunxin, “Japan: Former Chinese Ambassador to Japan interviewed 
on Sino-Japanese relations,” interview by Wang Guopei, 23 April 2008, 




Emperor Meiji in order to commemorate those individuals who 
died in service to their country.  It is a shrine rooted in 
the Shinto faith that houses the souls of almost 2.5 
million Japanese military dead.  In 1978, 1068 convicted 
war criminals from World War II, including 13 Class “A” war 
criminals and Imperial Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, became 
enshrined at Yasukuni.146  As a result, foreign dignitaries 
and ordinary citizens view official visits by prime 
ministers, cabinet members and members of the Japanese Diet 
as admiration of Japan’s aggressive past and as marking a 
return to the militarism that defined the early 20th 
century.147   
Additionally, former Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi paid regular visits to the Shrine during 
his tenure, even attending on August 15, the anniversary of 
Japan’s surrender to Allied Forces that concluded World War 
II.  He asserted that his trips were made in order to 
remember Japan’s aggression leading up to World War II and 
to use those mistakes as a reminder never to wage war and 
repeat that history.  In an observation after a visit to 
Yasukuni in 2002, he elaborated on his belief that  
the present peace and prosperity of Japan are 
founded on the priceless sacrifices made by so 
many people who lost their lives in war.  It is 





                     146 “Where war criminals are venerated,” 14 January 2003, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/13/japan.shrine, 
accessed 31 October 2004. 
147 Anthony Faiola, “Koizumi stirs anger with war shrine visit,” The 
Washington Post, 15 August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401425.html?nav=rss_world, 
accessed 08 June 2008. 
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firmly adhere to the resolution to embrace peace 
and renounce war to ensure that we never resort 
to tragic war.148    
However, each one of Koizumi’s visits to the 
Shrine resulted in an increase in distrust between Japan 
and her neighbors and a hindrance in the development of 
friendly relations as expressed by officials from both 
South Korea and China.  
c. Reparations 
In addition to a sincere apology, many Chinese 
and Koreans feel that the government of Japan should pay 
reparations to the aggrieved individuals, most notably the 
Comfort Women, for the damage that they incurred at the 
hands of the Japanese during World War II.  Tokyo does 
contribute funds to the Asian Women’s Fund as atonement 
money for the hardships that the women endured.  However, 
it does not consider the money reparation based on the 
belief that reparations are owed to government entities, 
not individuals, and on the fact that Japan settled the 
monetary issue with both China and the Republic of Korea in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty and in separate agreements 
with each government.149  Furthermore, the Japanese Courts 
have upheld the legality of the Japanese government’s 
claim.  Additionally, in March 2007, then Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe claimed that no evidence existed that 
demonstrated that the army forced the Comfort Women to 
                     148 Junichiro Koizumi, “Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi on the visit to Yasukuni shrine,” 21 April 2002, 
www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/04/21syokan_e.html, 
accessed 03 December 2004. 
149 Norimitsu Onishi, “World War II sex slaves lose in Japanese 
court,” 28APR07, www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/28/asia/web0428-japan-
41373.php, accessed 30 April 2008. 
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provide services at the military comfort stations.150   
Although he apologized after his remark, his statement, 
coupled with the lack of reparations, further solidified 
critics’ belief that the apologies uttered by numerous 
Japanese leaders are just rhetoric and not sincere. 
d. Rise of Japanese Nationalism 
Furthermore, Japan’s neighbors distrust the 
intentions of Tokyo due to a rise in nationalism within 
Japan.  Both China and Korea associate this national pride 
with the expansionism of World War II.  Since the issues 
stemming from the Japanese invasion of the two countries 
still linger unresolved and without an acceptable apology, 
the hint of a resurgence of Japan often angers many Chinese 
and Koreans, despite multiple assertions by Japanese 
leaders that Japan desires to be a leader of peace.  
Specifically, Prime Minister Fukuda has expressed this goal 
in numerous speeches for Japan to “play its role as a 
‘Peace Fostering Nation’ that contributes to peace and 
development in the world.”151   
As the nationalistic movement grows in Japan, 
both China and Korea experience an escalation of their own 
nationalism, which is often expressed in various fora 
throughout both countries.  Groups within each country have 
protested both former Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated 
                     150 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan orders history books to change passages on 
forced World War II suicides,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, 30 March 
2007, www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20070330-0757-japan-
forcedsuicides.html, accessed 03 June 2008. 
151 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister 
of Japan at the session on ‘The responsibility to protect: Human 
security and international action,’” speech given at Davos, 
Switzerland, 26 January 2008, 




trips to the Yasukuni Shrine and the approval of history 
textbooks that gloss over Japan’s aggression in World War 
II.  This nationalism also resulted in an outbreak of anti-
Japanese riots in China in May 2005 in response to Japan’s 
desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.152  
Therefore, Japan’s nationalism is not viewed by its 
neighbors as a positive method of bringing a country 
together in order to move forward.  Instead, China and 
Korea see this trend as hazardous to their own well-being 
based on the fact that Japan has failed to apologize 
sincerely to its neighbors and to allay their fears of a 
resurgence of Imperial Japan.    
C. CONCLUSION 
Finally, although a world economic power, Japan is 
actively seeking to expand its influence into the 
diplomatic arena.  Touting itself as a “Nation of Peace” 
that seeks greater international influence in order to 
further peaceful development around the world, Japan has 
already undertaken several endeavors that help push this 
updated foreign policy goal.  By amending Article 9 of its 
constitution, petitioning for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, participating in Gulf War II, and 
altering its function of ODA loans, Japan has encountered 
some internal debate and much external resistance from its 
neighboring countries.  This lack of support is a direct 
result of Tokyo’s inability to resolve its position on 
issues still stemming from World War II.  China and the 
Republic of Korea feel that the Japanese government has 
failed to offer a sincere apology for the atrocities                      152 Sunny Lee, “China, Korea: More nationalist than thou,” Asia Times 
Online, 14 May 2008, Open Source Document ID CPP20080515721009, 
accessed 09 June 08. 
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committed as Japan expanded across Asia in order to further 
its foreign policy objectives.  As a result, Tokyo needs to 
find a balance of assuring its close neighbors of a sincere 
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IV. IMPACTS OF APOLOGY ON REGIONAL RELATIONS 
The role of the apology by Japan for the atrocities 
that it committed in its sweep across Asia in the first 
half of the twentieth century, figures prominently in the 
current relationship that Japan enjoys with its closest 
neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea.  In fact, the 
issuance and subsequent reception of the “heartfelt 
remorse” defines the interaction of the government leaders.  
In general, Tokyo offers an apology; Beijing and Seoul 
counter with their belief in the insincerity of the remark, 
usually in reaction to an announcement by Japan of a new 
foreign policy undertaking, visit to Yasukuni Shrine, or 
amendment of history textbook.  Sincere animosity and fear 
of military resurgence of the Japanese exist among ordinary 
Chinese and South Korean citizens and remain a legitimate 
concern for their governments to manage.   
However, both of these governments use the apology 
issue in order to provide them leverage with Tokyo in 
pursuing diplomatic endeavors.  Often using the media as a 
conduit, this rehashing of World War II issues allows them 
to guide the reactions to events by their own countrymen, 
as well as Tokyo.  However, this political tool can only be 
used to a certain extent, as the futures of these countries 
are inextricably linked in joint desires for both economic 
and regional stability.  Despite this necessity for 
increased cooperation, several current day factors stress 
this venture of regional support, including territorial 
disputes coupled with future energy source concerns.  




own changing foreign policy goals, while still addressing 
the apology issue and legitimate fear of a remilitarized 
Japan remaining from World War II.   
A. ROLE OF THE APOLOGY 
This struggle to find the balance for the government’s 
responsibility for apologies and reparations owed to the 
victims of Japan’s aggression and its desire to expand its 
foreign policy agenda is the basis of its national 
identity.  This phenomenon shades every interaction with 
its neighbors, and it provides the Chinese and South Korean 
governments a natural leverage in negotiations, when 
conducting diplomatic ventures.   
1. Reception of Apology by China and Republic of 
Korea 
These governments only possess this capability because 
many Chinese and South Koreans still feel much distrust of 
the Japanese and fear of a resurgence of military might.153  
Many of these citizens suffered first hand from Japanese 
aggression, or they had immediate family members that did, 
and the memories of these events are still rooted deep in 
their daily existence.  Their impression of Japan is still 
based on the actions of the Imperial regime and often does 
not reflect any current understanding of modern day Japan.  
This fear is perfectly exemplified by the response of the 
Chinese public to the possibility of using Japan’s Air Self 
Defense Force planes to fly relief supplies into China in 
May 2008 after the devastating earthquake that shocked 
China’s Sichuan province.  Citing that Beijing expressed 
that the sight of Japanese military forces landing in China                      153 Ng Tze-wei, “Old rivals still wary of each other despite 
diplomatic thaw,” 03 June 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 05 June 2008. 
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could result in an unintended renewal of anti-Japanese 
sentiment, the Japanese opted to charter commercial planes, 
instead, at the behest of Beijing.154  Therefore, Japan must 
still be mindful of the second level consequences of its 
interactions with its neighbors. 
2. Use of Apology by China and Republic of Korea 
In addition to this real fear, the Chinese and South 
Korean governments use the media to impress upon their 
constituents a desired reaction to a specific occurrence in 
interactions between the governments, as a means to 
maintain a basic level of distrust of the Japanese in 
society.  This method works especially well in China.  The 
media plays such an important role in portraying the 
government’s opinion on any given issue, as the major 
newspapers, such as the China Daily, are censured by the 
government.  For example, a visit by former Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine was normally 
followed by a rush of newspaper articles discussing his 
sojourn and chronicling every lingering World War II 
atrocity, including Tokyo’s inability to atone properly for 
its actions and current diplomatic disagreements.155  This 
pattern allows for the aggrieved governments to shape the 
perception of the Japanese in their countries in order to 
provide them with leverage when interacting with Japanese 
government officials.   
                     154 “Japan decides not to use SDF aircraft to help quake victims in 
China,” The Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 2008, www.asahi.com/english/Herald-
asahi/TKY200805300185.html, accessed 30 May 2008. 
155 A search on any internet search engine of “Yasukuni” or “Japan 
textbooks” or “Comfort Women” yields numerous articles that follow this 
pattern.  For an example, please see: “Koizumi Visits Yasukuni War 
Shrine,” 16 October 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/10/16/shrine.koizumi/, accessed 
16 June 2008.    
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However, because the reactions of the people toward 
the Japanese are still rooted in an innate distrust that 
has been bolstered by their own governments, their response 
cannot always be controlled.  In April 2005, Koizumi 
announced Japan’s intention to seek a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council, and he simultaneously visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine.  The Chinese citizens reacted by 
instituting a boycott of Japanese goods and by rioting 
against local Japanese shop owners, which was not the 
desired level of response anticipated by Beijing.156  
Despite this occasional lapse, the Chinese and Koreans are 
quite adept at using the lingering World War II issues to 
their advantage, and it is a measure that Japan must be 
able to address as they forward their foreign policy goals. 
B. CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
In addition to World War II issues, Japan must also 
balance the requirements of current issues affecting 
relations with China and the Republic of Korea.  These 
three countries are closely tied to each other in a common 
thread for regional cooperation, through their inextricably 
linked economies and their shared regional security 
concerns with nuclear talks with North Korea.  This 
connection requires Japan to maintain dialogue flowing 
between the three countries.  However, Japan also faces 
several issues with each country that threaten to disrupt 
this effort of cooperation, including territorial disputes 
over the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan (East Sea), and 
the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands.   
                     156 “PRC Central Media not obligated to report on violent anti-
Japanese protests,” South China Morning Post, 04 April 2005, FBIS ID 
FEA20050404002267, accessed 05 April 2005. 
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1. Regional Cooperation 
a. Economy 
First, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan are 
all in possession of globally strong economies that are 
connected and thus dependent upon each other to remain 
successful.  Although China remains fervently dedicated to 
its socialist structure, it has embraced economic changes 
that have allowed China and Japan to accept each other as 
trading partners.  Thus, by 2001, Japan had transitioned 
into China’s top trading partner, with the two countries 
conducting over 130 billion US dollars worth of trade by 
2006.157  Also, both countries rely on the other for basic 
goods, as Japan receives over 20% of its imports from 
China,158 while China imports almost 15% of its total from 
Japan.159  Additionally, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
enjoy a similarly strong trade relationship, and their 
exchanges comprise roughly one sixth of South Korea’s total 
imports and exports.160  Therefore, both China and South 
Korea benefit from solid trade relations with Japan, adding 
incentives for continued cooperation. 
b. Regional Security 
Second, China, South Korea and Japan’s shared 
interest in regional stability, limits China and South 
                     157 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ, accessed 11 June 2008. 
158 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Japan, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ja.html#Econ, accessed 11 June 2008. 
159 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China. 
160 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Korea, South, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ks.html#Econ, accessed 11 June 2008. 
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Korea’s ability to raise too many objections to Japan’s 
apology.  For all three countries, North Korea poses the 
greatest threat to the stability of northeast Asia.  All 
three countries are opposed to its nuclearization, and all 
three governments seek to prevent any further development, 
especially after Pyongyang’s successful underground testing 
in October 2006.161  As a result, Beijing and Seoul view 
cooperation with Tokyo as a necessity to contain North 
Korea, and they have entered into various structures to 
facilitate this cooperation.  The three governments utilize 
the Six Party Talks, a forum designed specifically to 
engage the North Korean government over its nuclear 
development, as their primary means to resolve this 
issue.162 
Furthermore, leaders from the three governments 
understand that cooperation and active participation in 
various regional fora is necessary to promote regional 
stability.  In that vein, in a joint press statement at the 
Seventh Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic of 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in January 2007, 
they announced their belief that: 
the strengthening of future oriented trilateral 
cooperation among the three countries both serves 
the fundamental and long-term interests of the 
peoples of the three countries, and is of great 
significance for peace, stability and prosperity 
in Asia.163 
                     161 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, 
“Diplomatic white paper: Part 2,” 27 December 2007, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/whitepaper/index.jsp, accessed 
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162 Ibid. 
163 “Joint press statement of the seventh summit meeting among the 
People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea,” 14 
January 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/pmv0701/joint070114.pdf, accessed 11 June 2008. 
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Continuing to support this joint cooperation, the 
foreign ministers from Japan, China and Republic of Korea 
held their second foreign ministers’ trilateral meeting in 
June 2008 in Tokyo and discussed the regional and 
international situation and trilateral cooperation.  Thus, 
China and South Korea were motivated by regional security 
concerns to limit their opposition to the apologies issued 
by Japanese leaders. 
2. Regional Stressors 
However, although Beijing and Seoul are tied to the 
Fukuda government through their advantageous trade 
relations and their shared desires for regional security, 
both of these leaders remain distrustful of the Japanese.  
In addition to the disputes over World War II concerns, 
this lack of trust stems from current disagreements over 
territorial claims and energy sources in the East China Sea 
and the Takeshima Islands for China and South Korea, 
respectively.   
a. East China Sea 
First, the controversy between China and Japan 
surrounding the territorial boundaries of the East China 
Sea and its natural gas reserves adds to the strained 
relationship between the two countries.  Situated between 
Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and China’s eastern coastline, 
official surveys state that the East China Sea contains an 
estimated seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 
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approximately 100 billion barrels of oil.164  Both countries 
claim rights to the energy reserves.  China bases its claim  
that the fields lie within its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) because they are located on the natural continental 
shelf that extends from China’s mainland.  Japan, on the 
other hand, states that the resources fall within 200 
nautical miles of its coast, placing them within its EEZ.  
Both root their claims in international treaties; China 
cites the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf, 
while Japan follows the UN Convention of the Law of the 
Sea, thereby giving neither country the advantage through 
law.165   
As a result, the rights for tapping these natural 
resources equates to disagreement between the two 
governments.  In a joint statement issued by Hu Jintao and 
Yasuo Fukuda at the conclusion of Hu’s visit to Japan in 
May 2008, the leaders barely addressed the issue, only 
promising to “work together to make the East China Sea a 
sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship.”166   However, 
Beijing and Tokyo did reach an agreement in June 2008 for 
joint exploration of the oil fields.  Although Japan’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura deemed “this 
agreement…the first step toward realizing the common 
                     164 Anthony Faiola, “Japan-China oil dispute escalates,” The 
Washington Post, 22 October 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102101933.html, accessed 10 June 
2008. 
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near Japan,” 15 January 2003, FBIS Document ID JPP20040917000008, 
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understanding between leaders of the two countries (on) the 
East China Sea,”167 they have not settled the particulars of 
the arrangement.168  Thus, the development of the resources 
in the East China Sea, while firmly progressing toward 
resolution, still remains an issue that threatens to strain 
the relationship between China and Japan. 
b. Sea of Japan/East Sea 
Second, Japan and the Republic of Korea clash 
over the proper name of the Sea of Japan/East Sea (Nihon 
kai/Dong hae) and the ownership of Takeshima (Dokdo) 
Island.  This inability to reach an agreement on the proper 
names and ownership of the body of water and the island 
greatly increases the tension between the two countries.169  
The Sea of Japan (East Sea) is located between South 
Korea’s eastern shore and Japan’s western coastline, and 
both countries claim that its name for the body of water 
possesses historical precedence.   
Japan states that the Sea of Japan has been the 
recognized historical name, internationally, since the 
early 1800s, a time of international isolation for Japan.  
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, this 
timeframe establishes that the world used this name for the 
body of water prior to the awareness by the Japanese of its 
                     167 Masahiko Koumura, “Joint press conference by Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 
Akira Amari (Regarding Cooperation between Japan and China in the East 
China Sea),” 18 June 2008,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/6/0618.html, accessed 18 
August 2008. 
168 Koumura. 
169 Both countries have placed extensive documentation, including 
pamphlets and videos, on their ministry of foreign affairs’ websites 
that supports their claims to ownership and namesake.  The amount of 
proof provided by both countries denotes the importance of this issue 
to both countries.   
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use and before its colonization of Korea in the early 
1900s, thereby negating the South Korean argument.170  Also, 
in its position paper to the United Nations, Japan further 
supports its claim by referencing a 2005 survey conducted 
by its Ministry of Foreign of Affairs of the maps, atlases 
and textbooks of 67 countries from organizations such as 
ASEAN and G8.  According to the Ministry’s findings, over 
90% of the textbooks and atlases and over 80% of the maps 
label the disputed body of water as the Sea of Japan, and 
not the East Sea.171   
However, South Korea claims that no single name 
dominated as a designation for the body of water and that 
the use of the name, Sea of Japan, did not begin until the 
early 1900s, during Japan’s dominance of the region.  They 
also state that, as a protectorate of Japan, they were not 
granted any rights as a sovereign nation to present their 
name, East Sea, at the 1929 Monaco Conference of the 
International Hydrographic Organization.  This meeting 
resulted in the release of the first edition of the “Limits 
of Oceans and Seas,” the definitive reference for 
cartographers, in which the term Sea of Japan is used vice 
the East Sea.172   
                     170 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “A historical overview of 
the name ‘Sea of Japan,’” March 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/japan/pamph0606.pdf, accessed 13 
June 2008. 
171 “Japan position on the name ‘Sea of Japan’ in relation to papers 
prepared for 15(b) of the agenda,” submitted by Japan to the Ninth 
United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, 
New York 21-20 August 2007, 24 August 2007, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/9th-UNCSGN-Docs/E-CONF-98-CRP-
88.pdf, accessed 13 June 2008. 
172 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, 
“East Sea: An overview,” 2007, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/hotissues/eastsea/index.jsp#, 
accessed 13 June 2008. 
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In order to resolve this issue, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea submitted position papers to the Ninth 
United Nations Conference on the Standardization of 
Geographical Names held in New York from 21-30 August 2007.  
The Conference requested the countries continue to work out 
a viable solution and report to the tenth conference and 
that “individual countries could not impose specific names 
on the international community and standardization could 
only be promoted when consensus existed.”173  Since this 
step failed to produce a resolution, the leaders of both 
countries have promised to work to find an acceptable name.  
However, no progress has been made by either country, 
resulting in a point that allows for much tension between 
the two countries. 
c. Takeshima/Dokdo Islands 
Similarly, the debate between South Korea and 
Japan over the ownership and rightful name of a small group 
of islands located in the southern Sea of Japan (East Sea) 
provides another opportunity for an increased strain in the 
relationship between the neighbors.  Known as the Takeshima 
Islands in Japan and the Dokdo Islands in Korea, the 
current dispute over ownership dates to the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, and both countries claim history as its ally.  
Japan states that it had established sovereignty over the 
land by the mid-seventeenth century, when fisherman 
utilized the islands as a stopping point for fishing.  The 
San Francisco Peace Treaty returned sovereignty to Japan 
and South Korea, restoring South Korea’s lands subsumed by 
                     173 United Nations, “Ninth United Nations Conference on the 
standardization of geographical names,” New York, 21-30 August 2007, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/9th-UNCSGN-Docs/E-CONF-98-136-
Report.pdf, accessed 13 June 08. 
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Japan during colonization.  However, although the treaty 
delineated specific islands for inclusion in this release 
of land back to South Korea, it did not specifically list 
the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands.  This exclusion cemented 
Japan’s belief in full ownership of the land.174  As a 
result, Tokyo feels that the Republic of Korea’s subsequent 
habitation of the main island is “an illegal occupation 
undertaken on absolutely no basis of international law…and 
has no legal justification,”175 and it strongly protests its 
presence on the island.  Japan has also requested to 
resolve the issue in the International Court of Justice, 
which South Korea declines.   
The South Korean government counters that it is 
unnecessary to go to Court because “Dokdo so clearly 
belongs to Korea from the perspective of history, 
geography, and even international law (and) since Japan has 
neither sovereignty or control over the island, it has 
nothing to lose even if goes to Court.”176   Furthermore, 
South Korea also references historical facts to prove its 
ownership of the islands.  It claims that multiple maps 
dating back to the mid-fifteenth century depict Dokdo as a 
part of the Korean state.  Seoul also asserts that Japan 
illegally incorporated the islands in 1905, and at the 
conclusion of World War II, manipulated the wording in the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in order to keep the land from 
                     174 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The ten issues of 
Takeshima,” February 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/pamphlet_e.pdf, accessed 13 June 08. 
175 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The ten issues of 
Takeshima,” February 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/pamphlet_e.pdf, accessed 13 June 2008. 
176 Korean Culture and Information Service, “History of and 
sovereignty over Dokdo,” 23 March 2007, 
http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=15896, 
accessed 13 June 2008. 
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being specifically listed and under Japanese control.177  
Thus, each country jockeys for soul ownership of the 
islands in order to take advantage of its fertile fishing 
fields, adding one more area of concern for Japan in 
managing its relationship with its neighbors. 
Therefore, while Japan faces difficulty in 
managing its actions from World War II with China and South 
Korea, it also must account for current stressors in 
affecting the relationships.  While vital economic ties and 
shared regional security concerns increase the necessity of 
cooperation between the countries, territorial disputes 
threaten the potential for strain between the three 
governments. 
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
As Japan continues to strive to fulfill its altering 
foreign policy goals, its leaders must account for several 
competing factors that negate Japan’s ability to move 
forward in the international arena.  First, unresolved 
issues from World War II still shade the interactions with 
its neighbors, China and South Korea, and the perception of 
Japan shared by the citizens of these countries.  While 
real distrust stills exists within the populace of the 
region, the governments are adept at utilizing this fear as 
leverage in their interactions with Tokyo.  Additionally, 
Japan must balance this understanding with current regional 
concerns, including the necessity for cooperation to enjoy 
continued trade relations and to suspend the nuclearization 
of North Korea and for disagreements over territorial 
                     177 Korean Culture and Information Service, “History of and 
sovereignty over Dokdo,” 23 March 2007, 
http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=15896, 
accessed 13 June 2008. 
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claims in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan (East 
Sea).  Therefore, in order to accomplish this feat, Tokyo’s 
path for progression should address both the governments 
and the people of its neighbors.  Japan’s leaders should 
continue to express remorse, reassuring neighbors of its 
peaceful intent, address World War II issues while 
balancing support for own people, and continue to engage 
the governments and the people of China and the Republic of 
Korea diplomatically, economically and socially. 
1. Continuance of Apology 
First, in order to increase its influence in the 
international arena, Tokyo should continue to proffer 
apologies to its neighbors for the atrocities committed 
during World War II.  These apologies should be balanced to 
express the “heartfelt remorse” of the Japanese while still 
allowing for Japan to take the necessary steps to implement 
its foreign policy agenda.  In October 2006 at a press 
conference during the first visit to China by a Japanese 
prime minister since 1999, the Prime Minister Shinto Abe 
expressed that: 
I said we shall look at past history squarely and 
shall continue to conduct itself as a peaceful 
nation. Japan has come through the 60 years of 
the postwar period on the basis of the deep 
remorse over the fact that Japan in the past has 
caused tremendous damage and suffering to the 
people of the Asian countries, and left scars in 
those people. This feeling is shared by the 
people who have lived these 60 years and is a 
feeling that I also share. This feeling will not 
change in the future.178 
                     178 Shinto Abe, “Press conference by Prime Minister Shinto Abe 
following his visit to China,” 8 October 2006, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.html, 
accessed 12 June 2008. 
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His words perfectly blend the remorse of the past 
while looking forward to future endeavors.  It also 
stresses Japan’s continued role as a “nation of peace.”  
This function is extremely important to Japan as it moves 
forward in fulfilling its foreign policy goals because it 
gives the country a unique position in the international 
community.  This status as a “nation of peace” provides 
Tokyo with the ability to promote its peacekeeping 
operations, thereby extending its influence with multiple 
foreign governments and people.  
2. Sincerity of Apology 
Additionally, Japan should act to emphasize the 
sincerity of the apologies.  Government leaders can negate 
the negative reception of the apologies by adopting altered 
behaviors with the Yasukuni Shrine and the content of 
history textbooks.  Although China and the Republic of 
Korea both react to any visit by any government official to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, limiting the number of visits and 
visitors can reduce the amount of resultant friction, while 
still allowing for the visits to occur.  Also, ensuring 
that the dates of any visits do not correspond to an 
important anniversary of any event from World War II and 
eliminating visits by the current prime minister would also 
minimize the impact of the visits.   
Furthermore, the Japanese government, specifically the 
Minister of Education, should not approve any more 
textbooks that do not, at a minimum, include the basic 
facts concerning the Comfort Women, Unit 731 and the Rape 
of Nanking.  Mentioning these atrocities not only appeases 
the complaints from neighbors but it also teaches the youth 
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to increase awareness for the future generations.  It also 
demonstrates to the international community a true 
understanding and acceptance of past wrongs, signifying 
that Japan is truly ready to assume further responsibility 
in the international community.  Therefore, by coupling 
repentant action with the words of the apologies, Japanese 
leaders prove their commitment to peace and remorse. 
3. Engagement of China and Republic of Korea 
Third, in order to improve relations with China and 
South Korea, Japan should engage both the governments and 
the people diplomatically, economically and socially.  
Consistent interaction in these realms will help ease 
tensions between the leaders and the citizens of the 
neighboring countries.  Through diplomatic endeavors, Tokyo 
can aid understanding by increasing the interaction with 
government counterparts in Beijing and Seoul.  Better and 
more frequent communication between multiple levels of 
government officials provide a more receptive forum for 
expressing both foreign policy goals and the desire to 
remain a peace nation.  It also aids in gaining the trust 
of the people.  Seeing their leaders consistently and 
easily interact with their former enemy can help soften the 
view of the Chinese and South Korean citizens toward the 
Japanese.  Various diplomatic endeavors include conducting 
meetings at various conferences and official visits to 
China and South Korea, as well as hosting leaders from the 
two countries in Japan.  Economic engagement can also help 
ease tensions and help Japan implement its foreign policy 





Korea are already tightly linked.  Thus, continued solid 
trade relations can act as a base to establish 
commonalities in diplomatic and social realms.   
Additionally, Tokyo should focus on winning the hearts 
and minds of the people of China and South Korea, by 
engaging both countries on a social level.  Many citizens 
of the neighboring countries still feel a great deal of 
animosity toward the Japanese, as their only memories are 
of the brutalities suffered during World War II.  
Therefore, Tokyo should seek opportunities that can help 
gain the trust of the Chinese and Korean populace and 
change the perception of Japan as a militaristic society 
into Japan’s status as a “nation of peace.”  In fact, Japan 
is already investing in programs, such as cultural 
exchanges between students and sister city/sister state 
ventures, to promote friendship and understanding between 
Japan and China and Japan and South Korea.  Thus, by 
continuing and expanding these venues, Japan can lessen the 
animosity and constraints against its expansion of foreign 
policy goals. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Finally, Japan faces several challenges within its 
region as it seeks to alter its role in the international 
community.  In order to expand its area of influence 
outside of regional affairs and the world economic realm, 
Tokyo must first reach an understanding with its neighbors, 
China and the Republic of Korea, concerning the outliers 
from World War II and the perception of the apology in the 
societies.  This acceptance of the apology is aided by a 
shared desire for continued economic growth and for 
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regional security in containing North Korea.  Despite these 
ties, improved relations are hindered by the inability to 
settle territorial disputes with both China and South 
Korea.  However, Japan has several options that should 
provide a way to maintain its country’s own needs while 
still allowing for development of its relationships with 
its nearest neighbors.  By stressing its desire to maintain 
its status as a “Nation of Peace” and by engaging the 
governments and the people of China and the Republic of 
Korea diplomatically, economically and socially, Tokyo can 





Japan’s nationalistic rise in the first half of the 
twentieth century and the subsequent damage Japan’s 
military inflicted upon the towns and civilian populations 
of its neighboring countries still influences the 
relationships that Japan shares with them today.  The 
subjugation of the women from various countries, especially 
Korea, that the Japanese occupied to provide sexual 
services for the military members, the rampant looting, 
raping, burning and killing of civilians and their homes 
and stores when the Japanese entered the Chinese city of 
Nanking, and the experimentation on Chinese cities and 
citizens into biological and chemical warfare and 
battlefield surgery techniques resulted in an animosity 
toward the Japanese that still lingers with the Chinese and 
Koreans.  This resentment is also sharpened by the 
perceived lack of accountability by the Japanese for their 
actions at the Tokyo Tribunal at the end of the war.  The 
post-war trials held by the Allied Powers prosecuted only 
the very top leaders of Imperial Japan. They did not 
address all the atrocities committed, and Hirohito, the 
Japanese Emperor, escaped accountability and prosecution.  
These failures of the Tokyo Tribunal, coupled with the 
revitalization of Japan’s economy shortly after the 
conclusion of the Trials to counter an increasing spread of 
Communism, resulted in feelings among people in China and 
South Korea that Japan did not and subsequently has not 





This issue of apology plays an important role in 
relations today between Japan and her two neighbors, China 
and the Republic of Korea.  Tokyo maintains that numerous 
leaders and government officials have repeatedly apologized 
for Japan’s actions during World War II.  However, both 
Beijing and Seoul counter that these apologies were not 
sincere, as evidenced by trips by Japanese government 
officials to the Yasukuni War Shrine, a memorial that 
houses convicted Class “A” criminals from World War II and 
by the failure of the Japanese government to pay 
reparations to victims of Japan’s past aggression.  In its 
response, Tokyo asserts that the visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
serve as a reminder of what not to do and that governments 
are not obligated to pay reparations to individuals, only 
to other governments.  Thus, the Japanese believe that 
since the issue of reparations between Japan and China and 
the Republic of Korea had already been concluded via 
treaties, the Japanese government is not responsible for 
payments to individuals.   
Despite the real fears felt by the people of China and 
South Korea, the governments share common interests with 
Japan in the need of regional security and economic 
strength.  These collective concerns over the stability and 
nuclearization of North Korea and multiple links in the 
economies of the three countries result in cooperation 
between Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul to ensure success and 
stability in those two areas.  However, regional issues do 
exist that add stress to this cooperation; disagreements 
over names and ownership of territories and joining seas 
stand to add tension to the relationships that Japan shares 
with China and the Republic of Korea. 
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Additionally, the perception in China and the Republic 
of Korea that Japan’s apology lacks sincerity affects 
Japan’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals.  Since 
World War II, Tokyo has focused on regional concerns and 
has projected itself as a “nation of peace.”  Thus, by 
fully embracing the “no war clause” in its constitution, 
Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse in the 
international arena.  However, Tokyo is now extending its 
foreign policy reach beyond the region.  Through its bid 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to 
supplying logistical support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Japan is pressing beyond the constraints of its 
constitution and elevating the concerns of its neighbors.  
China and South Korea do not support Japan’s expanding 
foreign policy efforts, as they still equate this expansion 
with Japan’s militaristic rise that resulted in World War 
II. 
As a result, Japan must balance the inherent mistrust 
of China and the Republic of Korea and their shared desire 
for regional security and economic prosperity with its own 
aspiration to advance its influence in international 
affairs.  Success in this endeavor will require allaying 
the fears of the Chinese and Korean citizens that Japan is 
not now and never will return to its militaristic path of 
the past.  Acceptance of this by the governments of the 
neighboring countries will negate their ability to 
capitalize on their peoples’ fears by continual references 
to the World War II atrocities, thereby altering the 
dynamic of relations between the three countries.  However, 
due to the inherent competition between China and Japan for 
international success and regional supremacy, neither 
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country will ultimately adopt an overall Asia First 
diplomatic policy.  Although they may support joint 
measures that enhance regional standings, ultimately, the 
intense competition and rivalry will cause each country to 
act to further their own country’s interests without 
damaging their intertwined economic ties. 
This dynamic between the countries in Northeast Asia 
also affects the role that the United States plays in the 
region.  A traditional ally of Japan, the United States is 
heavily invested in the country.  With its large military 
presence and strong economic ties, Washington and Tokyo 
both generally act to support the continuation of their 
relationship.  Therefore, a changing dynamic in the 
interactions between Japan, China and the Republic of Korea 
would affect the position that Washington currently holds 
with Japan.  As Japan strengthens its regional role, its 
relationship with the United States could suffer.  An 
appearance of severing ties with Washington could promote 
regional support and raise Japan’s standing.  However, it 
is ultimately in Japan’s best interest to maintain a solid 
relationship with Washington in order to counter China’s 
rapid growth and future potential for regional dominance 
and position as international superpower.   
Finally, Japan’s apology for the atrocities that it 
committed upon its neighbors during World War II still 
affects its relations with them today.  The lingering 
animosity, the perception of the lack of sincerity in the 
offered apologies, and the use of the historical events by 
China and the Republic of Korea for political purposes 
continue to complicate relations between Japan and its 
neighbors.  Therefore, in order for Japan to move forward 
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with its new foreign policy goals, it must reach resolution 
with its neighbors by convincing both the people and the 
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